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CHAPTER I     Introduction 
Social scientists have long sought to understand how economic inequality and social mobility 
change over time or vary across societies. As far back as the 1950s, economist Simon Kuznets 
advanced the hypothesis that income inequality first increases and then declines in the course of 
economic development, which has been famously known as the Kuznets curve (Kuznets 1955). 
On the other hand, sociologists have proposed different explanations for cross-national variations 
in intergenerational social mobility. For instance, the “thesis of industrialism” predicts that the 
more industrialized a society, the higher the degree of social fluidity (Blau and Duncan 1967; 
Treiman 1970). Furthermore, it has been suggested that state socialist countries and welfare 
states may exhibit more intergenerational mobility than liberal democracies (Giddens 1973; 
Parkin 1971). To test these hypotheses, empirical studies have largely relied on cross-national 
comparisons at a point in time (e.g., Grusky and Hauser 1984). This approach, however, is 
methodologically flawed because the observed effects of economic development and political 
institution may be confounded by the influences of unobserved, country-specific historical and 
cultural factors.  
A more conservative strategy, therefore, is to look at temporal trends in a single country. 
In this regard, an excellent candidate for which the above questions can be addressed is China, as 
the country has experienced rapid industrial expansion as well as the demise of socialism since 
its economic reform that began in 1978. Income inequality in China has also grown 
tremendously over the past three decades: the Gini coefficient increased from 0.3 in 1980 to 0.55 
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in 2012. Why has inequality increased so much in China? How has it been connected to 
industrialization, marketization, and educational expansion? What about trends in social mobility? 
Has it declined due to China’s institutional transition from state socialism to a market economy, 
or has it increased due to China’s rapid industrialization? This dissertation represents my effort 
to answer these questions.  
In Chapter II, I investigate how the rise of earnings inequality in urban China has been 
shaped by three large-scale structural changes in the labor force since the mid-1990s: (1) the 
expansion of tertiary education; (2) the decline of state sector employment; and (3) a surge in 
rural-to-urban migration. Based on data from two nationally representative surveys, I use 
variance function regressions to decompose the growth in earnings inequality from 1996 to 2010 
into four components: changes in between-group earnings gaps, changes in within-group 
earnings variation, and two types of composition effects (distribution effect and allocation effect). 
I also employ counterfactual simulations to evaluate the utility of different explanations. Results 
show that nearly half of the growth in earnings inequality during this period is due to increases in 
returns to education, and that the other half can be attributed to compositional changes in the 
labor force. The composition effects stem chiefly from the expansion of tertiary education and 
the shrinkage of state sector employment. 
Chapter III examines long-term trends in intergenerational social mobility. Analyzing 
intergenerational data from six comparable, nationally representative surveys between 1996 and 
2012, I uncover two countervailing social mobility trends in post-revolution China. On the one 
hand, there is evidence of a decline in social fluidity following China’s transition from state 
socialism to a market economy, as the link between origin and destination in vertical social status 
has significantly strengthened. On the other hand, horizontal mobility between the agricultural 
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and nonagricultural sectors has increased sharply during the country’s rapid industrialization. 
Despite its recent decline, social fluidity in China is still much higher than that in mature 
capitalist societies. Moreover, cross-national comparisons reveal that a faster pace of 
industrialization is associated with greater horizontal mobility between the farming and 
nonfarming classes. Finally, mobility in China is characterized by disproportionate flows 
between the farming and the managerial/professional classes and between farming and self-
employment—patterns that are unique products of the Chinese household registration (hukou) 
system.  
The final chapter (chapter IV) proposes a methodological innovation that facilitates 
spatial and temporal comparisons in social mobility. I develop a shrinkage estimator of the log 
odds ratio for comparing mobility tables. Building on an empirical Bayes framework, the 
shrinkage estimator improves estimation efficiency by “borrowing strength” across multiple 
tables while placing no restrictions on the pattern of association within tables. Numerical 
simulation shows that the shrinkage estimator outperforms the usual maximum likelihood 
estimator (MLE) in both the total squared error and the correlation with the true values. 
Moreover, the benefits of the shrinkage estimator relative to the MLE depend on both the 
variation in the true log odds ratio and the variation in sample size among mobility regimes. To 
illustrate the effects of shrinkage, I contrast the shrinkage estimates with the usual estimates for 
the mobility data assembled by Hazelrigg and Garnier (1976) for 16 countries in the 1960s and 
1970s. For mobility tables with more than two categories, the shrinkage estimates of log odds 
ratios can also be used to calculate summary measures of association that are based on 
aggregations of log odds ratios. Specifically, I construct an adjusted estimator of the Altham 
index, and, with a set of calibrated simulations, demonstrate its usefulness in enhancing both the 
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precision of individual estimates and the accuracy of cross-table comparisons. Finally, using two 
real data sets, I show that in gauging the overall degree of social fluidity, the adjusted estimator 
of the Altham index agrees more closely with results from the Unidiff model than does the direct 
estimator of the Altham index. 
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CHAPTER II     Increasing Returns to Education, Changing Labor Force Structure, and  
the Rise of Earnings Inequality in Urban China, 1996-2010 
Since its beginning in 1978, China’s market-oriented reform has brought not only unprecedented 
economic growth but also a tremendous increase in economic inequality.  In 1980, the Gini 
coefficient for family income in China was around 0.3 (UNU-WIDER 2008), but now it has 
reached the alarming level of 0.55 (Xie and Zhou 2014), a magnitude that places China among 
the most unequal societies in the world.  While it is widely recognized that economic inequality 
in China is marked by a large rural-urban gap in industrial development (Knight and Song 1999; 
Sicular et al. 2007; Yang and Zhou 1999), recent survey data indicate that inequality within 
urban areas has also widened considerably over the past two decades (Jansen and Wu 2012; Li, 
Sato, and Sicular 2013). As shown in Figure II.1, the Gini coefficient for individual earnings 
climbed from 0.40 in 1996 to 0.49 in 2010.  The pace of this growth is striking when we consider 
that it took 27 years for the corresponding measure in the U.S. to increase by the same proportion: 
from 0.33 in 1979 to 0.41 in 2006 (McCall and Percheski 2010). 
 What are the sources of the rising inequality in urban China? How has the change in 
aggregate inequality been driven by changes in individual and contextual determinants of 
earnings? Previous research has discussed three major mechanisms: (1) widening regional 
disparities (e.g., Hauser and Xie 2005), (2) increasing returns to education (e.g., Jansen and Wu 
2012; Zhao and Zhou 2002), and (3) growing residual inequality (e.g., Hauser and Xie 2005; 
Meng, Shen, and Xue 2013). Few studies, however, have explicitly examined the role of 
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changing labor force structure in the evolution of earnings inequality in China. Indeed, since the 
mid-1990s, the composition of the urban labor force has been dramatically altered by three large-
scale structural changes: (1) the expansion of tertiary education, (2) the decline of state sector 
employment, and (3) a surge in rural-to-urban migration. This article investigates whether, to 
what extent, and in what ways these institutional and demographic shifts have shaped the recent 
upswing of earnings inequality in urban China.  
 To accomplish this goal, I capitalize on variance function regressions (Western and 
Bloome 2009) to decompose the change in earnings inequality from 1996 to 2010 into four 
components:  changes in between-group earnings gaps, changes in within-group earnings 
variation, and two types of composition effects. I also use counterfactual simulations to 
adjudicate between the competing explanations for the rise of inequality. Results show that 
nearly half of the growth in earnings inequality during this period is due to increases in returns to 
education, and that the other half can be attributed to compositional changes in the labor force. 
The composition effects result chiefly from changes in educational distribution and in sectoral 
structure, which have in turn been driven by the expansion of tertiary education and the 
shrinkage of state sector employment.  
 Although focusing on the context of urban China, the present study sheds light on the 
evolution of earnings inequality both in other developing countries and in other post-socialist 
states. On the one hand, a sizable body of research—in both sociology and economics—has 
investigated the linkage between educational distribution and aggregate inequality in earnings 
(Jacobs 1985; Knight and Sabot 1983; Lam and Levison 1992; Nielsen and Alderson 1997). It 
might be supposed that an expansion in college education would necessarily reduce the level of 
inequality in a developing country. However, researchers have concurred that an increase in the 
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supply of highly educated workers can actually drive up aggregate inequality through a more 
dispersed educational distribution, unless this effect is offset by a drop in returns to education. 
My analyses lend empirical support to this proposition by showing a substantial contribution of 
college expansion to the rise of inequality in urban China. On the other hand, like China, the 
post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have also downsized their state 
sectors through various forms of privatization, a process that has also been related to observed 
increases in economic inequality. For example, based on cross-national comparisons, Bandelj 
and Mahutga (2010) report a positive effect of the degree of privatization on the level of income 
inequality in CEE. By analyzing trends from micro-level data, the present study not only 
demonstrates this link in China, but, as we will see, also measures the impact of state sector 
downsizing on earnings inequality over the past decade and a half.  
Existing Explanations 
In the course of China’s post-socialist transition, the rise of earnings inequality has been 
propelled by a wide array of social, economic, and demographic processes. Here I review three 
mechanisms that have been extensively discussed in the literature: widening regional disparities, 
increasing returns to education, and growing residual inequality. 
Widening Regional Disparities 
Economic inequality in China has long been characterized by its vast regional disparities.  Back 
in the Mao era, different regions already varied greatly in their pace of industrialization (Kanbur 
and Zhang 2005). During earlier years of the market-oriented reform, regional inequality slightly 
narrowed; yet it widened again over the 1990s, mainly due to a persistent gap in growth rates 
between the coastal and the inland provinces (Wan 2007). In fact, at the outset of the economic 
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reform, a number of coastal cities (known as Special Economic Zones) were granted preferential 
policies, such as tax breaks and duty exemptions, to attract both domestic and foreign 
investments. Thanks to these policies, coastal provinces such as Guangdong immediately 
enjoyed rapid growth in both foreign direct investments (FDI) and exports. These initial benefits, 
combined with economies of scale, soon translated into cumulative advantages (Démurger et al. 
2002; Golley 2002). The coastal provinces, as a result, sustained higher growth rates than the 
inland provinces for a long time, leading to an ever-increasing coastal-inland divide. Inequality 
in economic development caused differentiation in personal earnings. As Xie and Hannum (1996) 
have shown, by 1988 the most influential predictor of earned income in urban China was not 
individual attributes but rather regional indicators.  In a follow-up study, Hauser and Xie (2005) 
report that the influence of regional differences on earnings determination increased from 1988 
to 1995.  While more recent trends remain unclear, there is strong evidence that regional 
disparities persisted, if not widened, into the 2000s. Using the 1% population sample survey of 
2005, Zhang and Wu (2010) find that 41% of the total variation in earnings can be explained by 
between-county differences.   
 To the extent that regional gaps have widened during the period under investigation, this 
article aims to identify how much of the observed rise in earnings inequality is attributable to 
increased regional gaps. To accomplish this goal, I base my counterfactual analyses on multiple 
regressions that control for educational attainment and other individual attributes. This procedure 
helps eliminate the influence of potentially confounding factors, such as increasing returns to 
education, a process that would exacerbate regional inequality if human capital was distributed 
unevenly across regions.  
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Increasing Returns to Education 
The growth in earning inequality may also be explained by increasing returns to education. For 
earlier years of China’s economic reform, returns to schooling have been found to be extremely 
low, which has been largely attributed to the absence of markets (Peng 1992; Walder 1990; 
Whyte and Parish 1985; Xie and Hannum 1996; Zhao and Zhou 2002). Nonetheless, the gradual 
expansion of markets has led theorists to predict an increase in the importance of human capital 
in the long term (Cao and Nee 2000; Nee 1989, 1991, 1996). This prediction has been widely 
supported by subsequent empirical studies (Bian and Logan 1996; Hauser and Xie 2005; Wu and 
Xie 2003; Zhou 2000). For instance, Hauser and Xie (2005) find that net returns to schooling in 
urban China almost doubled from 1988 to 1995. Jansen and Wu (2012) also demonstrate a steady 
increase in returns to schooling over the reform period: “one additional year of schooling 
translated into a 2 percent net increase in income in 1978, 3.5 percent in 1985, 4.5 percent in 
1990, 5.5 percent in 1995, 6.6 percent in 2000, and 7.7 percent in 2005.” However, in 1999, the 
Chinese government launched a college expansion project that has significantly raised college 
enrollments over the following years. As a result, the supply of college-educated workers has 
increased rapidly, which may have slowed down the growth in returns to education (Meng et al. 
2013).   
 How would an increase in returns to education influence the size of earnings inequality? 
Xie and Hannum (1996) show that, holding constant the marginal distribution of human capital, 
an increase in returns to schooling generally drives up total inequality. Thus I expect the rise of 
inequality during the study period to be partly driven by an increase in returns to education, 
although the size of this increase since the early 2000s may have been moderated by an 
 10 
 
expanding supply of college-educated workers. As with changing regional gaps, the impact of 
changing returns to education will be assessed by counterfactual analyses. 
Growing Residual Inequality  
Beyond changes in observed determinants of earnings, another explanation for the rise of 
earnings inequality is growing residual variation. Labor economists studying inequality in the 
U.S. have found that the rise of wage inequality in the 1970s and 1980s was primarily due to an 
increased residual variance of earnings after individual-level predictors such as schooling, 
experience, and demographic attributes are factored in (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1993).  This 
finding has been closely linked to the theory of “skill-biased technological change” (henceforth 
SBTC), which posits that the growth in residual inequality is mainly a result of rising returns to 
unobserved skills among workers with the same observed characteristics (Acemoglu 2002). 
Similarly, the rise of earnings inequality in urban China from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s has 
also been related to an increase in residual variation (Hauser and Xie 2005).  
 While traditional regression-based analyses assume homoscedasticity and thus regard 
residual variance as uniform among all individuals, recent research on inequality has begun to 
address heterogeneity in residual variance across population subgroups (Lemieux 2006; Western 
and Bloome 2009). When this heterogeneity is taken into account, the change in total residual 
inequality over a time period consists of two components: one represents changes in residual 
inequality among people in the same observed groups, and the other represents the effect of 
changing group proportions. Indeed, Lemieux (2006) challenges the SBTC explanation by 
showing that the growth of residual inequality in the U.S. during the1990s was propelled mainly 
by changes in the proportion of workers in different experience-education cells rather than by 
changes in within-cell variation. In this study, I also separate out these two drivers of residual 
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inequality by modeling sectoral differences in residual variation in China. Specifically, I consider 
changes in within-sector variation as essential changes in residual inequality, and use allocation 
effect to denote the impact on residual inequality of changes in sectoral composition. For 
example, if inequality is greater in the private sector than in the state sector, a shift in the 
workforce from the state sector to the private sector can amplify the level of overall inequality 
through an allocation effect. 
A Missing Link: Composition Effects 
Among the above explanations, widening regional disparities and increasing returns to education 
can be construed as changing earnings gaps between population subgroups (in these cases, based 
on region and education), whereas growing residual inequality reflects increases in within-group 
variation. If the composition of the labor force is fixed, all sources of change in overall inequality 
can be subsumed under these two categories. Nonetheless, when group proportions are time-
varying, trends in aggregate inequality may also be driven by composition effects. In fact, since 
the mid-1990s, the composition of the labor force in urban China has been dramatically reshaped 
by three large-scale socio-economic changes: (1) the expansion of tertiary education, (2) the 
decline of state sector employment, and (3) a surge in rural-to-urban migration (for more details, 
see Figure II.2). Below I discuss how these compositional shifts may have contributed to the rise 
of earnings inequality during the past two decades.   
Expansion of Tertiary Education 
In 1999, as noted above, the Chinese government instituted a college expansion policy that has 
significantly enlarged the pool of college-educated workers over the ensuing years. The purpose 
of this policy was two-fold. First, it was aimed to increase the supply of skilled labor for 
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sustaining China’s rapid economic growth. Second, the extension of schooling for the youth was 
designed as a strategy to alleviate the pressure of re-employment for those being laid off during 
the reform of state-owned enterprises (see the next subsection).  Coupled with cohort 
replacement, the expansion of higher education has, since 2003, substantially changed the 
educational distribution among the urban workforce. In 2003, those who had finished at least a 
three-year college constituted only 9.1% of the urban population (aged 6+); but by 2010, this 
portion had more than doubled to 21.5% (see Figure II.2).  
 What is the implication of such a compositional shift for earnings inequality? Before the 
college expansion, the educational distribution among urban workers was highly concentrated at 
the levels of junior and senior high school, suggesting a relatively homogeneous labor force in 
terms of observed skills. However, as more youths were provided the opportunity of obtaining a 
college degree, cohort replacement has resulted in a more dispersed educational distribution, 
which, everything else being equal, should have inflated earnings inequality in the aggregate. 
Thus we would expect that the rise of earnings inequality in urban China can be partly 
attributed to changes in educational distribution.  
Shrinkage of State Sector Employment 
As with other post-socialist countries, one central aspect of China’s economic transition has been 
the decline of state sector employment. Although the economic reform in urban China started as 
early as 1984, it was concentrated on the goods market during its first decade. In the early 1990s, 
the vast majority of urban workers were still employed in state-owned enterprises (henceforth 
SOE), the prototypical work unit in pre-reform urban China. By 1994, however, most of the 
SOEs had excessive employment and nearly half were incurring losses, severely hindering 
China’s economic development (Cao, Qian, and Weingast 2003).  To remedy this problem, the 
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Chinese government has, since 1995, been reforming and downsizing state-owned enterprises 
under the policy of “grasp the large and let go the small.” On the one hand, the central 
government began to merge and restructure large SOEs, thereby consolidating its control over 
certain strategically vital industries, such as power generation, telecommunications, and raw 
materials. On the other hand, at the local level, small SOEs were largely privatized, and workers 
in medium-sized SOEs were massively laid off.  As a result, since the mid-1990s, tens of 
millions of former SOE employees have been pushed into the private sector. Among new 
entrants to the labor market, the share of state sector employment has also dwindled. Such an 
imbalance between exit and entry has caused a steady decline in state sector employment during 
the past two decades: in 1996, 64% of the urban workers were employed in the state sector, but 
by 2010 this figure had reduced to 27% (see Figure II.2).  
 It is widely acknowledged that SOE reform has been successful in vitalizing China’s 
market economy. At the same time, however, the massive transfer of workers from the state 
sector to the private sector may have exacerbated the country’s earnings distribution. Before the 
reform, the majority of urban workers were employed by the state with a centrally-planned wage 
system, which imposed a highly compressed earnings distribution. Earnings variation within the 
state sector was driven primarily by differences in bonus income, which depended heavily on the 
profitability of particular work units (Wu 2002; Xie and Wu 2008). Overall, earnings inequality 
was substantially lower in the state sector than in the private sector, partly because observed and 
unobserved skills were less rewarded by the state, and partly because the paychecks of state 
employees were less sensitive to the ebb and flow of the market. This pattern, in fact, has been 
fairly stable over time. Today’s SOEs in China continue to benefit from sheltered markets, 
implicit government subsidies, and politically favored bank loans. By shielding the SOEs from 
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market competition, these institutional protections have sustained a relatively low dispersion of 
earnings across the state sector. Meanwhile, the downsizing of SOEs has pushed tens of millions 
of workers into the private sector, where their heterogeneity in ability and skills is more likely to 
translate into different rates of pay. Therefore, given that earnings inequality is lower in the state 
sector than in the private sector, we would expect that the massive transfer of workers from the 
state sector to the private sector has contributed to the rise in aggregate inequality.   
Rural-to-urban Migration 
In the pre-reform era, rural-urban migration in China was severely restricted by the Chinese 
household registration system, i.e., hukou, a state institution established to limit population 
mobility. Since 1978, the market reform has moderately eased the restriction on temporary 
migration, but without a corresponding relaxation of the hukou system. This has resulted in a 
“floating population” of urban dwellers with rural hukou status (Wu and Treiman 2004). The size 
of this floating population was relatively small, if not negligible, until the early 1990s. Since then, 
China’s economic growth has been increasingly propelled by export-oriented manufacturing 
sectors and government-sponsored infrastructure projects, which have significantly raised the 
demand for young and low-skilled workers in many urban centers. The surge of demand for 
cheap labor has attracted wave after wave of young and poorly-educated migrants from the rural 
inland.  As a result, the volume of rural migrants residing in urban centers has increased 
tremendously over the past two decades. According to Meng et al. (2013), the number of rural-
urban migrant workers was about 39 million in 1997, but by 2009 the size had increased to 145 
million, constituting more than a quarter of the urban labor force.  
 Despite their growing contribution to the economic boom in urban areas, it remains 
extremely difficult for these rural migrants to acquire a local hukou in the cities where they work. 
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As noted by Chan and Buckingham (2008), in such large cities as Beijing, Shanghai and 
Guangzhou, which are the major destinations of recent waves of rural-urban migrants, the entry 
requirements for obtaining a local hukou are highly prohibitive and clearly beyond the reach of 
most migrant workers. The lack of local hukou status is perhaps the greatest disadvantage for this 
ever-increasing floating population because hukou status was and still is a very strong 
institutional constraint that shapes one’s social and economic wellbeing in urban China (Treiman 
2012; Wu and Treiman 2004, 2007). Not only is local hukou status a prerequisite for such social 
welfare benefits as health care and unemployment insurance, but migrant workers without a local 
hukou also suffer from a range of unfair treatments in the workplace, such as wage arrears and 
denial of payments.  
Given the persistent power of hukou in shaping one’s economic wellbeing, how has the 
recent upsurge in rural-to-urban migration affected earnings inequality in urban China? Meng 
and Zhang (2001) have shown that in the 1990s, migrant workers without an urban hukou were 
subject to a wage penalty in the urban labor market. It is unclear, however, whether such a wage 
gap narrowed or widened into the 2000s, and whether the wage gap necessarily translated into an 
earnings gap between the two groups (given that migrant workers typically work for longer hours 
and more days than local urban workers). Nonetheless, to the extent that an earnings gap exists 
across the hukou axis, the surge in rural-to-urban migration should have subjected a larger 
share of the workforce to an earnings penalty, thereby aggravating the level of overall inequality. 
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Methods 
𝑅2-based Methods 
In this study, I use the variance of log earnings to gauge the size of earnings inequality. The 
variance measure is particularly useful for studying trends in inequality because it can be easily 
decomposed into between-group and within-group components using ANOVA (see Mouw and 
Kalleberg 2010).  The ratio of the between-group component to the total variance provides an 
intuitive measure for the between-group contribution to total inequality, a measure that is 
equivalent to the 𝑅2 in a linear regression of log earnings on group dummies. To examine 
temporal trends in the size of between-group contribution, one may simply track changes in this 
ratio over time. For example, Kim and Sakamoto (2008) used the time series of occupation 𝑅2 to 
assess the relative importance of between-occupation and within-occupation inequality in 
explaining the rise of wage inequality in the U.S.  Moreover, in a regression model that controls 
for additional covariates, we can evaluate the net contribution of a particular set of variables 
using incremental or partial 𝑅2s (see Kim and Sakamoto 2008; Meng et al. 2013).  As a 
preliminary analysis, I also use partial 𝑅2 to detect temporal variations in the importance of 
different earnings determinants. 
This approach, however, is prone to conflate changes in population composition with real 
changes in between-group disparities and in within-group variation. To see this, consider a 
hypothetical population consisting of only two groups: college graduates and high school 
graduates. Assume that the average gap in log earnings between the two groups is fixed, and that 
the within-group variation among college graduates is greater than that among high school 
graduates. Now imagine an education expansion that enlarges the share of college graduates 
from 10% to 50%. In this case, earnings inequality will increase, neither via increased returns to 
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education nor via increased within-group inequality, but via a change in population composition. 
Specifically, the impacts of this compositional shift are two-fold. On the one hand, given an 
earnings premium for college graduates, a more balanced distribution of the two groups will 
automatically inflate the overall variance. On the other hand, given that within-group inequality 
is higher among college graduates than among high school graduates, an increased share of the 
former will also raise the level of total inequality. The R2 measure, however, may drift in either 
direction without a clear interpretation.  
Variance Function Regressions and Decomposing Trends in Inequality 
My analytical focus is to disentangle different sources of the observed rise in earnings inequality, 
thus adjudicating between the competing explanations discussed in the preceding sections. To 
achieve this goal, I decompose the change in the variance of log earnings based on variance 
function regressions (Western and Bloome 2009), a technique that allows both the mean and the 
variance of log earnings to depend on a set of explanatory variables.   
 To sketch this approach, let us denote by 𝑌𝑡 the dependent variable, log earnings, at time 
𝑡. Meanwhile, denote by 𝑋𝑡 and 𝑍𝑡 two sets of independent variables that predict the mean and 
the variance of log earnings, respectively. We then jointly estimate the conditional mean and the 
conditional variance of log earnings as linear functions of 𝑋𝑡 and log-linear functions of 𝑍𝑡, 
yielding two fitted models: 
𝐸�(𝑌𝑡|𝑋𝑡) = ?̂?𝑡𝑋𝑡, 𝑉𝑉𝑉� (𝑌𝑡|𝑍𝑡) = 𝑒𝑒𝑒 (?̂?𝑡𝑍𝑡), 
where ?̂?𝑡 and ?̂?𝑡 represent estimated coefficients of 𝑋𝑡 and 𝑍𝑡. As a result, the fitted total 
variance of log earnings can be written as  
𝑉�𝑡 = 𝑉𝑉𝑉� �𝐸�(𝑌𝑡|𝑋𝑡)� + 𝐸��𝑉𝑉𝑉� (𝑌𝑡|𝑍𝑡)� = 𝑉𝑉𝑉� �?̂?𝑡𝑋𝑡� + 𝐸�[𝑒𝑒𝑒�?̂?𝑡𝑍𝑡�].  (1) 
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This equation can be seen as a parametric analog of ANOVA, with the first component 
corresponding to between-group inequality and the second component within-group inequality. 
Accordingly, the change in total inequality from time 𝑡 to another time point 𝑡′ (𝑡 < 𝑡’) can be 
written as  
𝑉�𝑡′ − 𝑉�𝑡 = 𝑉𝑉𝑉� �?̂?𝑡′𝑋𝑡′� − 𝑉𝑉𝑉� �?̂?𝑡𝑋𝑡� + 𝐸��𝑒𝑒𝑒�?̂?𝑡′𝑍𝑡′�� − 𝐸��𝑒𝑒𝑒�?̂?𝑡𝑍𝑡��,      (2) 
where the first contrast 𝑉𝑉𝑉� �?̂?𝑡′𝑋𝑡′� − 𝑉𝑉𝑉� �?̂?𝑡𝑋𝑡� measures the change in between-group 
inequality, and the second contrast 𝐸��𝑒𝑒𝑒�?̂?𝑡′𝑍𝑡′�� − 𝐸��𝑒𝑒𝑒�?̂?𝑡𝑍𝑡�� measures the change in 
within-group inequality. These two parts can be further decomposed to separate the effects of 
changing coefficients (𝛽 and 𝜆) from those of changing distributions of 𝑋 and 𝑍. Specifically, 
equation (2) can be expanded as 
𝑉�𝑡′ − 𝑉𝑡� = ?̂?𝐵 + 𝛿𝐷 + 𝛿𝑊 + 𝛿𝐴,     (3) 
with  
𝛿𝐵 = 𝑉𝑉𝑉� �?̂?𝑡′𝑋𝑡� − 𝑉𝑉𝑉� �?̂?𝑡𝑋𝑡� 
𝛿𝐷 = 𝑉𝑉𝑉� �?̂?𝑡′𝑋𝑡′� − 𝑉𝑉𝑉� �?̂?𝑡′𝑋𝑡� 
𝛿𝑊 = 𝐸��𝑒𝑒𝑒�?̂?𝑡′𝑍𝑡�� − 𝐸��𝑒𝑒𝑒�?̂?𝑡𝑍𝑡�� 
𝛿𝐴 = 𝐸��𝑒𝑒𝑒�?̂?𝑡′𝑍𝑡′�� − 𝐸��𝑒𝑒𝑒�?̂?𝑡′𝑍𝑡��. 
 In this decomposition, the first term, 𝛿𝐵, measures the change in between-group earnings 
gaps. For example, if region is the only predictor of earnings, then 𝛿𝐵 represents the impact of 
widening (if 𝛿𝐵 > 0) or narrowing (if 𝛿𝐵 < 0) regional gaps on total inequality. The second term, 
𝛿𝐷 , gauges the change in between-group inequality due to changes in population composition. 
Recent research on the U.S. labor market has revealed a polarization of the occupational 
structure, i.e., growing employment in both high- and low- paying occupations and hollowing 
out of the middle (Massey and Hirst 1998; Mouw and Kalleberg 2010). Such compositional 
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changes would drive up overall inequality even if between-occupation differences in average 
earnings were fixed. For this reason, I refer to 𝛿𝐷 as distribution effect. Clearly, changes in 
between-group gaps (𝛿𝐵) and the distribution effect (𝛿𝐷) together constitute the total change in 
between-group inequality (𝛿𝐵 + 𝛿𝐷). The third term, 𝛿𝑊, characterizes the change in within-
group variation among people with the same observed characteristics. In the economics literature, 
this component is intimately connected with the theory of SBTC, which stresses the role of 
increasing returns to skills (often unobserved) in the growth of residual inequality. The last term, 
𝛿𝐴, identifies the change in within-group inequality due to changes in population composition. 
As discussed in the preceding section, the massive transfer of workers from the state sector to the 
private sector in urban China may have raised overall inequality as a result of unequal residual 
variations between the two sectors—even if the amounts of within-sector inequality stayed 
unchanged over time. Hence I term 𝛿𝐴 allocation effect. The separation of the allocation effect 
from 𝛿𝑊 enables us to distinguish the impacts of compositional shifts in the labor force from 
more inherent changes in residual inequality. The structure of this four-component 
decomposition is shown concisely in Table II.1. 
 Note that the above decomposition is not algebraically unique. In equation (3), the 
difference between 𝑉𝑡′ and 𝑉𝑡 is decomposed in a way that changes in coefficients happen first 
and changes in population composition come second. Reserving this order yields an alternative 
decomposition. Below I use Type I decomposition to mean equation (3) and call the alternative 
Type II decomposition.  
Counterfactual Analysis 
Results from variance function regressions can be used to construct counterfactual levels of 
inequality, thus enabling us to assess the utility of competing explanations (Western and Bloome 
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2009).  For example, to evaluate the effect of changing returns to education, we can calculate the 
following counterfactual:  
𝑉�
𝑡′
𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒=𝛽�𝑡
𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 𝑉𝑉𝑉� �?̂?𝑡′−𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑋𝑡′−𝑒𝑒𝑒 + ?̂?𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑋𝑡′𝑒𝑒𝑒� + 𝐸�[𝑒𝑒𝑒 (?̂?𝑡′𝑍𝑡′)],  (4)  
where 𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒 denotes the coefficient (or a set of coefficients) for education, and 𝛽−𝑒𝑒𝑒 denotes the 
coefficients for all other predictors. Equation (4) gauges the level of inequality that would have 
been observed at time 𝑡′ had returns to education stayed at the level of time 𝑡. Thus the 
difference between 𝑉�𝑡′ and 𝑉�𝑡′
𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒=𝛽𝑡
𝑒𝑒𝑒
 identifies the contribution of changing returns to 
education to the change in overall inequality from 𝑡 to 𝑡′. 
 To assess the impact of a compositional shift, we can reweight the observed data at time 
𝑡′ to make the marginal distribution of the corresponding variable identical to that at time 𝑡 (see 
Lemieux 2006).  For instance, to gauge the effect of college expansion, we can fix the marginal 
distribution of educational attainment at time 𝑡 by appropriately down-weighting college 
graduates and up-weighting others in the sample at time 𝑡′, i.e., 
𝑉�
𝑡′
𝜋𝑒𝑒𝑒=𝜋𝑡
𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 𝑉𝑉𝑉� 𝜋𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒�?̂?𝑡′𝑋𝑡′� + 𝐸�𝜋𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒[𝑒𝑒𝑒 (?̂?𝑡′𝑍𝑡′)],   (5) 
where 𝜋𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒 denotes the educational distribution at time 𝑡, and its appearance as subscript means 
that corresponding weights are used to calculate the variance and the expectation. The 
composition effect of changing educational distribution is thus identified by the difference 
between 𝑉�𝑡′ and 𝑉�𝑡′
𝜋𝑒𝑒𝑒=𝜋𝑡
𝑒𝑒𝑒
:  
𝑉�𝑡′ − 𝑉�𝑡′
𝜋𝑒𝑒𝑒=𝜋𝑡
𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 𝑉𝑉𝑉� �?̂?𝑡′𝑋𝑡′� − 𝑉𝑉𝑉� 𝜋𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒�?̂?𝑡′𝑋𝑡′� + 𝐸�[𝑒𝑒𝑒 (?̂?𝑡′𝑍𝑡′)] − 𝐸�𝜋𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒[𝑒𝑒𝑒 (?̂?𝑡′𝑍𝑡′)]. 
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The above expression reveals that the composition effect consists of two parts, representing 
changes in between-group and in within-group inequalities. Hence, the first part corresponds to 
the distribution effect, and the second part corresponds to the allocation effect. 
 While the above illustrations are for the variable of education, the same techniques can be 
employed to gauge the effects of changes in other determinants of earnings. Table II.2 shows 
how the competing explanations discussed earlier will be examined by counterfactual analysis. 
For example, I will assess the allocation effect of state sector shrinkage by reweighting the 2010 
data such that the sectoral composition equals that in 1996. However, since the educational 
distribution may systematically differ across sectors, the reweighting method is unable to 
manipulate the marginal distribution of one variable without changing that of the other. 
Therefore, in the following analysis, I also examine the combined effects of changing 
educational and sectoral compositions by fixing their joint distributions at the 1996 level.  
Data 
I use data from two nationally representative sample surveys: the 1996 survey of “Life History 
and Social Changes in Contemporary China” (henceforth LHSCCC 1996) and the 2010 wave of 
the Chinese General Social Survey (henceforth CGSS 2010). Although these two surveys have 
different names, their data are highly comparable for my trend analysis. First, both surveys used 
a multi-stage stratified sampling design under which one adult was randomly selected from each 
sampled household (Li and Wang 2012; Treiman and Walder 1998). Second, in both surveys, the 
fieldwork was implemented by the same organization—the Department of Sociology at Renmin 
University of China. Moreover, the two surveys adopted the same rule to demarcate urban and 
rural populations—namely, whether the sampled household belonged to a neighborhood 
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committee (urban) or a village committee (rural)—which ensures that the two urban samples are 
consistent in their coverage.  
 While CGSS 2010 collected data from all 31 provinces of mainland China, the sampling 
frame of LHSCCC 1996 did not include Tibet. To maintain the comparability of labor markets 
over time, I excluded Tibet from the CGSS 2010 data as well (step 1: N1996=3087, N2010=7081). 
Since Tibet represents only 0.2% of the Chinese population (National Bureau of Statistics of 
China 2011), its exclusion is unlikely to weaken the representativeness of the data. To assess 
earnings inequality among the economically active population, I further restricted both samples 
to those who were between ages 20 and 69 and gainfully employed with annual earnings greater 
than 100 1996 Yuan (step 2: N1996=2024, N2010=3050).1 After eliminating a small number of 
respondents with missing covariates, we have 2019 individual workers from LHSCCC 1996 and 
3040 from CGSS 2010. 
 The dependent variable, earnings, refers to the total amount of earned income, including 
wages and salaries, bonuses, and profits from private businesses.2 Earnings in 1996 are inflation-
adjusted to 2010 Yuan based on official CPI rates (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2011). 
To adjudicate between the competing explanations for the rise of inequality, I use the following 
explanatory variables: province, level of education, sector of employment, and hukou status. To 
                                                          
1 In this step, the sample size dropped more substantially for CGSS 2010 than for LHSCCC 1996. 
This is mainly due to their differences in fieldwork implementation rather than a substantial 
decline in labor force participation. According to data from the World Bank, the labor force 
participation rate in China dropped by only 4 percentage points during this period, from 75% in 
1996 to 71% in 2010.    
2 In LHSCCC 1996, profits from private businesses were measured at the family-level. Hence I 
divided them by the number of working family members before treating them as a part of 
personal earnings.  
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better identify composition effects, I treat education as a categorical variable containing six 
levels of educational attainment: (1) no schooling, (2) elementary school, (3) junior high school, 
(4) senior high school or vocational high school, (5) vocational college, (6) four-year college or 
above.  While most previous studies treated sector of employment as a state-market dichotomy, I 
adopt a tripartite typology of sector: (1) state sector, which includes government agencies, public 
organizations, and state-owned enterprises, (2) private sector, which includes domestic private 
enterprises, foreign-invested firms, joint ventures, as well as collective enterprises and 
institutions,3 and (3) self-employment. Hukou status is coded as a binary variable (non-
agricultural vs. agricultural) in order to identify rural-urban migrants. The regression model for 
the mean of log earnings also includes sex, age, age squared, and party membership as covariates. 
 Table II.3 reports some descriptive statistics. The first two columns show the population 
share of different subgroups in 1996 and 2010. With regard to sex, age, and party membership, 
the group proportions are fairly similar across the two years, although the workforce appears 
slightly older in 2010. The share of workers holding a rural hukou increased sharply, from 12% 
in 1996 to 27% in 2010, reflecting the sheer scale of rural-to-urban migration. Thanks to college 
expansion, the proportion of workers who had a college degree (either vocational or regular) 
more than doubled. Moreover, state sector employment declined dramatically: in 1996, 59% of 
the workers were employed in the state sector, but by 2010 this portion had reduced to 27%.  
 The next two columns present the group-specific means of log earnings. Overall, we see a 
substantial increase in earnings for both men and women, both party members and non-members, 
and all age groups. However, on average, earnings growth seems larger for permanent urban 
                                                          
3 Collective institutions and enterprises typically do not receive financial support from the central 
and local governments. Compared with state-owned organizations, they are less regulated by the 
state and closer to market forces. Therefore they are classified into the private sector.  
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dwellers and more-educated workers than for rural-urban migrants and less-educated workers. 
The last two columns demonstrate the group-specific levels of inequality, measured by the 
variance of log earnings. We find that the rise of earnings inequality is greater among party 
members and permanent urban dwellers than among non-members and rural-urban migrants. 
Moreover, for both years, earnings dispersion is much lower in the state sector than in the private 
sector, and the self-employed exhibit the highest within-group inequality. 
Results 
Partial 𝑅2s from Conventional Regressions 
To gauge the influence of a given set of variables on earnings inequality, past research has often 
relied on 𝑅2 or partial 𝑅2 from multiple regressions of log earnings.  As discussed earlier, this 
approach is not well suited for studying trends in inequality because it is prone to conflate 
changes in population composition with inherent changes in between-group gaps and within-
group variation. For a given time point, though, it can provide a snapshot of the structure of 
earnings inequality. In Figure II.3, the bar plots show the net contributions of province, education, 
sector of employment, and hukou status to the overall inequality, measured by the corresponding 
partial 𝑅2s. First, we find that province is the most influential factor shaping earnings inequality 
in urban China: in both years, nearly 15% of the variation in log earnings can be explained by 
interprovincial disparities, even after covariates such as sex, age, and education are controlled for. 
Second, we see a sharp increase in the importance of education: the partial 𝑅2 grew from 4.7% in 
1996 to 12.3% in 2010.  Finally, sector of employment accounts for roughly 3% of total 
inequality at both time points, and the explanatory power of hukou status is negligible for both 
years.    
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 The above results highlight the significance of region and education in maintaining 
earnings inequality in urban China. Nonetheless, they do not reveal the sources of the growth in 
inequality. For example, the rise in the partial 𝑅2 of education could stem either from real 
increases in returns to education or from changes in educational composition (i.e., distribution 
effect). I now turn to results from variance function regressions, which provide a basis for both 
decomposition and counterfactual analyses.  
Variance Function Regressions and Decomposition of the Rise in Inequality 
Table II.4 reports the results from variance function regressions. The first two columns present 
the effects of different predictors on the mean of log earnings. First, for both years, we see an 
earnings penalty for females, a premium for party-members, and a quadratic effect of age, which 
are all consistent with previous research on earnings determination in urban China (e.g., Xie and 
Hannum 1996). However, we find that the effect of rural hukou is not significantly different from 
zero in either 1996 or 2010, indicating that there may not be an earnings penalty for rural-urban 
migrants when covariates, such as education and sector, are factored in. Meanwhile, we see a 
sharp rise in economic returns to a college degree (either vocational or regular) over this period: 
in 1996, a worker with a four-year college education was expected to earn 30% (𝑒0.264 − 1) 
more than a worker with only a high school diploma; by 2010, this gap had widened to 84% 
(𝑒0.608 − 1).4 In addition, for both years, we observe an earnings premium for workers in the 
state sector compared with employees in the private sector. The self-employed seem to have 
improved their position enormously: in 1996, they earned markedly less than the other two 
                                                          
4 As both estimated coefficients are asymptotically normal and independent, it is easy to show 
that the z-score for their difference, 𝛽
�2−𝛽�1
�𝑠𝑒�2�𝛽�2�+𝑠𝑒�2(𝛽�1), is highly significant.  
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groups, but by 2010 they had become the most advantaged group, earning about 20% (𝑒0.183 − 1) 
more than state sector workers.  
 My earlier argument presumes that residual inequality is substantially lower in the state 
sector than in the private sector. To model sectoral differences in residual inequality, I use sector 
dummies as predictors in the variance regressions.5 As shown in the last two columns, estimated 
residual variation is much smaller in the state sector than in the private sector, and the self-
employed are the most unequal group. This pattern holds true in both years, although to a lesser 
extent in 2010 than in 1996. This heterogeneity in residual variance underlies my hypothesis that 
the decline of state sector employment has raised the level of overall inequality through an 
allocation effect.  
 Based on the coefficient estimates in Table II.4, I decompose the change in inequality 
from 1996 to 2010 into the four components expressed by equation (3). The bar plots in Figure 
II.4 show the results from both Type I and Type II decompositions. We find that changes in 
between-group earnings gaps account for 34%-46% of the total growth in earnings inequality, 
depending on the way the decomposition is performed. Distribution effect (i.e., change in 
between-group inequality through compositional shifts) explains 22%-34% of the total growth, 
whereas allocation effect (i.e., change in within-group inequality through compositional shifts) 
contributes 21%-37%.  Taking them as a whole, we conclude that more than half of the rise in 
inequality over this period is attributable to compositional shifts in individual and contextual 
characteristics. By contrast, the contribution of 𝛿𝑊 ranges from -5%-12%, suggesting that 
                                                          
5 Because there is no strong reason to assume differences in residual inequality across other 
social dimensions, sector of employment is used as the only predictor in the variance model.  
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changes in within-group dispersion have very small if any impact on the change in earnings 
inequality over this period.  
Counterfactual Analyses: Evaluation of Competing Mechanisms 
I now assess the utility of different explanations through counterfactual analyses. In Table II.5, 
the first column presents the variances of log earnings adjusted for changes in between-group 
gaps (i.e., 𝛽) and in within-group variation (i.e., 𝜆), and the second column shows the 
counterfactual change from 1996 to 2010 when between-group/within-group effects are fixed at 
the 1996 level. The third column reports the percentage of the total change explained, that is, 
other things being equal, how much of the total rise in inequality would have disappeared had the 
corresponding between-group/within-group effects stayed unchanged during this period. First, 
fixing the coefficients of province dummies yields an adjusted variance of 0.839, suggesting that 
changing interprovincial disparities accounts for none of the total growth in inequality. In 
contrast, by fixing the coefficients of educational attainment, we find that rising returns to 
education explains 45.2% of the total growth. The next row shows that had all between-group 
earnings gaps stayed at the 1996 level, 45.8% of the increased inequality would have disappeared. 
A comparison of the above two numbers indicates that changes in between-group gaps are 
almost entirely driven by increases in returns to education. Finally, by fixing the coefficients in 
the variance model (𝜆), we find that changes in within-sector earnings variation have virtually no 
influence on the rise of inequality over this period.  
 Table II.6 shows the variances of log earnings adjusted for a range of compositional 
shifts and the corresponding contributions of distribution effects, allocation effects, and total 
composition effects. First, we find that the distribution effect of changing hukou composition is 
close to nil, which echoes the fact that rural hukou is not statistically significant in predicting log 
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earnings. In other words, because there is no discernible gap in earnings between rural-urban 
migrants and permanent urban workers, changing hukou composition has little impact on the 
trends in earnings inequality. Second, the distribution effect of education, which results chiefly 
from the college expansion policy, accounts for 21.9% of the total change in inequality. That is, 
more than a fifth of the increased variation in log earnings can be attributed to a more dispersed 
educational distribution.6 Third, the allocation effect of changing sectoral composition also 
explains about one fifth of the increased inequality. This finding demonstrates the crucial role of 
state sector shrinkage: Because within-sector variation is substantially lower in the state sector 
than in the private sector, the massive labor influx into the private sector has inflated earnings 
inequality in the aggregate.  
 Although we do not assume any effects of hukou and education on the variance of log 
earnings, both changing hukou composition and changing educational composition exhibit 
allocation effects as well. This is because the distributions of hukou and of educational 
attainment are not independent of the distribution of sector of employment. Indeed, according to 
the 2010 data, rural-urban migrants are more likely to work in the private sector than permanent 
urban workers, and college-educated workers are more likely to work in the state sector than 
other educational groups. Therefore, a down-weighting of rural-urban migrants will lower the 
average within-group inequality, whereas a down-weighting of college-educated workers will 
                                                          
6 Since the college expansion primarily benefitted the younger cohorts, age and education are 
fairly correlated in the 2010 data. Therefore the reweighting of the educational distribution 
inevitably altered the age structure, which may have biased the results. To alleviate this concern, 
I conducted auxiliary analyses by adjusting the conditional distribution of education given age 
(i.e., 𝜋𝑒𝑒𝑒|𝑎𝑎𝑒) such that the educational distribution resembles that in 1996 but the age 
distribution remains at the 2010 level. The results are substantively identical to those reported in 
Table 6.  
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heighten it. As a result, we observe a positive allocation effect of rural-urban migration and a 
negative allocation effect of changing educational composition. These allocation effects, 
however, should not be taken at face value because the compositional shifts of hukou and 
education may be closely intertwined with changes in sectoral structure. Hence I proceed to 
examine the combined effects of different compositional shifts by fixing the joint distribution of 
the corresponding variables at the 1996 level. In particular, by fixing the joint distribution of 
education and sector, we find that 41.9% of the total increase in inequality results from 
compositional changes in education and sector of employment. This number, not surprisingly, 
roughly equals the sum of the distribution effect of changing educational composition and the 
allocation effect of changing sectoral composition. Finally, when the joint distribution of all 
observed characteristics (i.e., the data matrices 𝑿 and 𝒁) is fixed at the 1996 level, the increased 
variance from 1996 to 2010 drops from 0.304 to 0.137, suggesting that 54.9% of the total growth 
in inequality is due to compositional shifts in individual and contextual characteristics. Of these 
composition effects, about three quarters (41.9%/54.9%=76.3%) come from changing 
educational and sectoral distributions.  
 In short, the counterfactual analyses show that the rise of earnings inequality from 1996 
to 2010 is primarily driven by (1) increases in returns to education, (2) a more dispersed 
educational distribution, and (3) changes in sectoral structure. In particular, the composition 
effects of (2) and (3) stem from the policy of college expansion and the institutional downsizing 
of state-owned enterprises. 
Conclusion and Discussion  
Earnings inequality in urban China has grown sharply over the past two decades. To account for 
the rise of inequality in urban China, prior studies have offered three major explanations: 
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widening regional gaps, increasing educational returns, and growing residual inequality. In this 
article, I examined how the recent upswing in earning inequality has been shaped by three large-
scale structural changes: (1) college expansion, (2) state sector shrinkage, and (3) rural-to-urban 
migration. To adjudicate between existing explanations and these composition effects, I used 
variance function regressions to decompose and simulate the change in earnings inequality 
between 1996 and 2010. My results suggest that nearly half of the growth in earnings inequality 
during this period can be explained by increases in returns to education, and that the other half is 
attributable to compositional shifts in the labor force. The composition effects are mainly due to 
changes in educational and sectoral distributions, which in turn result from the expansion of 
tertiary education and the shrinkage of state sector employment.  
 Moreover, we find little effect of the upsurge in rural-urban migration on earnings 
inequality. In fact, my regression results show no significant difference in earnings between rural 
migrant workers and permanent urban workers once covariates, such as education and sector, are 
taken into account. This finding does not necessarily contradict earlier studies that demonstrate a 
wage penalty for rural migrant workers (Meng and Zhang 2001) because a wage penalty is not 
equivalent to a gap in total earnings—considering that rural migrants usually work for longer 
hours and more days than local urban workers. In addition, it is worth noting that although rural-
urban migration seems to have limited impact on earnings inequality in urban China, it may have 
a profound influence on economic inequality in China as a whole. Assuming that migrant 
workers earn more in urban areas than they would in their rural origins, an increasing volume of 
migrant workers can narrow the gap between these two otherwise segregated and unequal 
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populations (i.e., urban and rural hukou holders), thereby reducing the level of nationwide 
inequality.7 
 Methodologically, this study illustrates the utility of variance function regressions, a 
technique recently proposed by Western and Bloome (2009), for studying trends in inequality.  
By simultaneously modeling the mean and the variance of log earnings, this method allows the 
change in earnings inequality to be decomposed into four components: changes in between-
group gaps (𝛿𝐵), changes in within-group variation (𝛿𝑊), distribution effect (𝛿𝐷), and allocation 
effect (𝛿𝐴). Different from 𝑅2-based methods, this approach distinguishes the dynamics of 
inequality (i.e., analyzing the change in inequality) from the statics of inequality (i.e., analyzing 
the level of inequality). In a society, the principal factors that maintain the level of inequality do 
not always correspond to the major forces that drive the change in inequality. In fact, while 
geographic disparities remain to be the largest contributing factor to the level of inequality in 
China (Xie and Zhou 2014), we find that the rise of inequality in urban areas since the mid-1990s 
is not much driven by widening provincial disparities, but largely propelled by increasing returns 
to education and composition effects. An analysis of trends in 𝑅2, however, would not 
disentangle composition effects from inherent changes in between-group gaps or within-group 
variation. For example, Figure II.3 has shown a tremendous growth in the partial 𝑅2 of education, 
yet this growth does not necessarily stem from an increase in returns to education. Without a 
                                                          
7 The same logic may be applied to speculate on the effects of interprovincial migration. Because 
of differences in pay and employment opportunities in manufacturing and service jobs, 
interprovincial migration in today’s China is characterized by the flow of unskilled/semiskilled 
workers from inland, less developed regions to coastal, more developed regions. Given that these 
low-end workers would earn even less in their places of origin, interprovincial migration may 
have a mitigating effect on the rise of nationwide inequality. Undoubtedly, further research is 
needed to test this conjecture.  
 32 
 
careful decomposition of the trend, we cannot separate the effect of changing returns to 
education from the effect of changing educational distribution.  Similarly, without an explicit 
modeling of heteroscedasticity across employment sectors, we would conflate real changes in 
within-sector inequality with shifts in sectoral composition.   
Substantively, this study provides new insights into the way economic inequality can be 
shaped by rapid socio-structural changes. For example, standard economic theory predicts that 
ceteris paribus, an educational expansion will cause a decline in returns to schooling owing to 
increased market competition. By this logic, if educational expansion produces a composition 
effect that drives up earning inequality, it may be offset or even outweighed by a drop in returns 
to education. This countervailing effect has been observed in both African and Latin American 
countries (Knight and Sabot 1983; World Bank 2011). My analyses, however, depict a different 
picture for China: returns to higher education have increased since the mid-1990s despite a 
growing supply of college-educated workers. As a result, these two forces have operated in the 
same direction toward a higher level of inequality. The impact of an educational expansion on 
inequality, therefore, may not always be predicted by a “partial equilibrium model;” instead, it 
can be shaped by an array of supply-side, demand-side, and non-market processes in a historical 
context. 
 While my analyses have broadly linked the growth in inequality to changes in earnings 
determinants, they are limited in revealing the complexity of micro-level processes. For example, 
although the observed increase in returns to education comports with the market transition theory, 
it is not necessarily due to market forces per se. First, if students with more (unobserved) family 
resources selectively obtained more education, the increase in estimated returns to education 
would reflect an increase in the compounded effects of schooling and family resources. Second, 
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during the economic reform, state bureaucracies have increasingly emphasized educational 
credential in resource allocation, which may have also raised the observed returns to education. 
In fact, owing to state sponsorship, part-time adult colleges—which confer nearly a third of 
undergraduate diplomas in China—are much more likely to recruit mid-career cadres and state 
professionals than less privileged individuals (Lai 2014). If this effect had intensified over the 
study period, the observed increase in returns to college may have also been inflated.  
  The results of variance regressions show a markedly lower level of inequality in the state 
sector than in the private sector. This difference in residual inequality could also result from a 
wide range of sources. First, according to the human capital theory, residual inequality is often 
interpreted as reflecting the return to and the dispersion of unobserved skills. Compared with the 
state sector, the private sector is more directly exposed to market competition, under which 
variation in unmeasured skills is more likely to translate into different rates of pay. Also, workers 
in private firms may be more heterogeneous in unobserved skills than state sector employees 
(Wu and Xie 2003), which would lead to greater inequality in the private sector even if returns to 
unobserved skills were identical between the two sectors. Second, compared with the state sector, 
private firms may use more discriminatory practices in hiring and promotion, thus creating pay 
disparities even between workers with the same level of productivity. Third, as noted earlier, 
state-owned enterprises in China enjoy an array of institutional protections—such as 
government-granted monopoly and politically-favored bank loans—that help maintain a 
relatively low level of earnings dispersion among their employees. Finally, the difference in 
residual inequality between the two sectors could also stem from their differences in 
occupational and industrial structure. An assessment of these competing explanations, however, 
requires a large dataset that includes comprehensive measures of skills and detailed occupational 
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characteristics. I leave this challenge for future research. This study, though, highlights an 
important micro-macro nexus, that is, given that residual inequality is higher in the private sector 
than in the state sector, a decline in state sector employment will drive up earnings inequality in 
the aggregate.  
 Earnings inequality in urban China has been on a steady rise since the early 1980s 
(Jansen and Wu 2012). Although the time span of my data does not allow an evaluation of the 
trends prior to 1996, previous research has shown that the growth in earnings inequality among 
urban workers up to the mid-1990s was chiefly propelled by widening regional gaps and 
increases in residual variation (Hauser and Xie 2005). Since then, however, the composition of 
the urban labor force has been significantly changed by college expansion, state sector 
downsizing, and a surge in rural-urban migration. By explicitly taking into account these 
institutional and demographic shifts, this article has demonstrated that the growth in earnings 
inequality over the past fifteen years stems mainly from increased returns to education and 
composition effects. In light of these results, I believe that the rise of inequality in urban China 
has been driven by different forces during different stages of the economic reform. 
Understanding such stage-dependent dynamics of earnings inequality greatly enriches our 
knowledge about the multifaceted processes of economic transformation in post-socialist China. 
 35 
 
Figure II.1 Earnings Inequality among Working Population in Urban China, 1996-2010 
 
Note: Data are from the 1996 survey of “Life History and Social Changes in Contemporary China” 
(LHSCCC) and five waves of the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) from 2003 to 2010. Assuming 
the log-normality of earnings distribution, the Gini coefficients were calculated using the parametric 
formula 𝐺 = 2𝛷([𝑉/2]0.5) − 1, where 𝑉 is the variance of log earnings and 𝛷 is the cumulative 
distribution function of standard normal distribution (see Allison [1978], 874).  
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Figure II.2 Compositional Changes in Urban China, 1996-2010 
 
Note: The solid line shows the increasing share of college-educated people among the urban population at 
ages 6 and above (source: China Population and Employment Statistics Yearbook); the dashed line shows 
the declining share of workers in the state sector in urban China (source: China Labour Statistical 
Yearbook); the dot-dash line shows the increasing numbers of rural migrant workers in urban China 
(source: World Bank [2009] for years 1997-2007 and National Bureau of Statistics of China for years 
2008-2010).   
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Figure II.3 Partial R^2s for Province, Education, Sector, and Hukou Status in 1996 and 2010 
 
Note: Besides these four key independent variables, all regression models also include sex, age, age 
squared, and party membership as covariates. For a variable 𝐾, partial 𝑅2= 𝑅
2−𝑅−𝐾
2
1−𝑅−𝐾
2 , where 𝑅2 is for the 
model that includes all independent variables, and 𝑅−𝐾2  is for the model that includes all independent 
variables except 𝐾.  
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Figure II.4 Decompositions of the Rise in Earnings Inequality in Urban China, 1996-2010 
 
Note: δB=changes in between-group earnings gaps, δW=changes in within-group earnings variation, 
δD=distribution effect (𝛿𝐷), δA=allocation effect (𝛿𝐴), δD + 𝛿𝐴=total composition effect.  
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Table II.1 Four-component Decomposition of the Change in Inequality 
 
Changes in  
Between-group/Explained 
Inequality (𝜹𝑩 + 𝜹𝑫) Changes in  Within-group/Residual Inequality (𝜹𝑾 + 𝜹𝑨) 
Non-compositional 
Changes (𝜹𝑩 + 𝜹𝑾) Changes in  Between-group  Earnings Gaps (𝛿𝐵) Changes in  Within-group Earnings Variation (𝛿𝑊) 
Compositional 
Changes (𝜹𝑫 + 𝜹𝑨) Distribution Effect (𝛿𝐷) Allocation Effect (𝛿𝐴) 
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Table II.2 Evaluation of Competing Explanations 
Competing Explanations Mechanisms 
Parameters to be Fixed 
at the 1996 Level 
Widening Regional Disparities Changes in Between-group Gaps 𝛽𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟 
Increasing Returns to Education Changes in Between-group Gaps 𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒 
Growing Residual Inequality Changes in Within-group Variation 𝜆 
Expansion of Tertiary Education Distribution Effect 𝜋𝑒𝑒𝑒 
Shrinkage of State Sector Employment Allocation Effect 𝜋𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑟 
Rural-to-urban Migration Distribution Effect 𝜋ℎ𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑒 
Note:  𝜋𝑒𝑒𝑒, 𝜋𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑟 and 𝜋ℎ𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑒 denote the population distribution respectively by educational attainment, 
by sector of employment, and by hukou status.  In this article, hukou status is used to distinguish between 
permanent urban residents and rural-urban migrants in urban China.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 41 
 
Table II.3 Descriptive Statistics of Population Share, Mean, and Variance of Log Earnings 
  Population Share 
Mean of Log 
Earnings 
Variance of Log 
Earnings 
  1996 2010 1996 2010 1996 2010 
Sex 
Male 0.59 0.57 8.94 9.97 0.56 0.85 
Female 0.41 0.43 8.65 9.63 0.51 0.80 
Age 
20-29 0.27 0.19 8.82 9.92 0.64 0.73 
30-39 0.31 0.31 8.79 9.97 0.42 0.81 
40-49 0.28 0.34 8.84 9.77 0.53 0.79 
50-59 0.12 0.13 8.94 9.61 0.53 0.99 
60-69 0.03 0.03 8.49 9.10 1.33 1.19 
Party 
Membership 
Not Party-member 0.82 0.81 8.77 9.73 0.60 0.84 
Party-member 0.18 0.19 9.06 10.21 0.30 0.74 
Hukou Status 
Urban 0.88 0.73 8.83 9.92 0.53 0.87 
Rural 0.12 0.27 8.72 9.56 0.73 0.73 
Educational 
Attainment 
No Schooling 0.03 0.02 8.13 8.89 0.56 0.75 
Elementary School 0.14 0.14 8.64 9.28 0.82 0.77 
Junior High School 0.39 0.25 8.80 9.51 0.63 0.72 
Senior High School or 
Vocational High 
School 
0.30 0.27 8.87 9.82 0.36 0.66 
Vocational College 0.08 0.18 9.02 10.16 0.32 0.51 
Four-year College or 
Above 0.05 0.14 9.25 10.61 0.21 0.64 
Sector of 
Employment 
State Sector 0.59 0.27 8.91 10.08 0.24 0.53 
Private Sector 0.23 0.51 8.81 9.71 0.59 0.80 
Self-employment 0.18 0.23 8.52 9.77 1.43 1.26 
Note: Samples sizes are 2019 for LHSCCC 1996 and 3040 for CGSS 2010. All numbers in this table were 
adjusted using sampling weights. 
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Table II.4 Regression Results for Mean and Variance Functions in 1996 and 2010 
 Explanatory Variables 
Mean Regression Variance Regression 
1996 2010 1996 2010 
 Intercept 
8.690*** 9.135*** -1.657*** -1.125*** 
(0.158) (0.193) (0.064) (0.067) 
 Female 
-0.222*** -0.307***   
(0.025) (0.026)   
 
Age 
0.027*** 0.065***   
(0.008) (0.009)   
Age2/100 
-0.025** -0.089***   
(0.009) (0.011)   
 Party Membership 
0.075* 0.155***   
(0.031) (0.034)   
 Rural Hukou 
0.015 0.000   
(0.050) (0.034)   
Educational 
Attainment 
No Schooling -0.600*** -0.743***   (0.086) (0.096)   
Elementary School 
-0.152*** -0.486***   
(0.045) (0.047)   
Junior High School 
-0.068* -0.252***   
(0.029) (0.037)   
Senior High School or 
Vocational High School 
(Reference Group) 
    
    
Vocational College 
0.079† 0.315***   
(0.043) (0.038)   
Four-year College or Above 
0.264*** 0.608***   
 (0.051) (0.042)   
Sector of 
Employment 
State Sector 
(Reference Group)  
   
    
Private Sector 
-0.112** -0.127*** 0.794*** 0.326*** 
(0.036) (0.029) (0.121) (0.082) 
Self-employment 
-0.358*** 0.183*** 1.843*** 1.043*** 
(0.061) (0.046) (0.134) (0.098) 
Model 𝑹𝟐 0.240 0.415   
Note: †p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests). Numbers in parentheses are standard 
errors. The mean models also control for province dummies, for which the coefficient estimates are 
not reported here. The mean and variance models were jointly fitted via maximum likelihood 
estimation (Western and Bloome 2009).   
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Table II.5 Adjusted Variances for Changes in Between-group Gaps and Within-group Variation 
 2010 
Change from 
1996 to 2010 
Percentage of 
Change Explained 
Fitted Variance 0.839 (0.028) 
0.304 
(0.044)  
Fixing Changes in    
Regional Disparities (𝛃𝐫𝐫𝐫𝐫𝐫𝐫) 
0.839 
(0.034) 
0.305 
(0.041) 
-0.2 
(6.7) 
Returns to Education (𝛃𝐫𝐞𝐞) 
0.701 
(0.027) 
0.167 
(0.042) 
45.2 
(7.5) 
All Between-group Gaps (𝛃) 0.699 (0.030) 
0.165 
(0.038) 
45.8 
(7.9) 
All Within-group Variation (𝛌) 0.853 (0.046) 
0.319 
(0.032) 
-4.7 
(16.1) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are bootstrap standard errors (250 replications). Bolded numbers 
identify the main driving forces of the rise in inequality.  
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Table II.6 Adjusted Variances for Changes in Population Composition 
 
2010 Change from 1996 to 2010 
Percentage of Change Explained 
 
Distribution 
Effect 
Allocation 
Effect Total 
Fitted Variance 0.839 (0.028) 
0.304 
(0.044)    
Fixing Compositional Changes in      
Hukou Status (𝛑𝐡𝐞𝐡𝐫𝐞) 
0.826 
(0.030) 
0.292 
(0.044) 
-1.5 
(1.2) 
5.6 
(1.4) 
4.1 
(2.4) 
Education (𝛑𝐫𝐞𝐞) 
0.802 
(0.028) 
0.268 
(0.044) 
21.9 
(1.6) 
-9.8 
(1.5) 
12.1 
(2.6) 
Sector (𝛑𝐬𝐫𝐬𝐬𝐫𝐫) 
0.780 
(0.033) 
0.246 
(0.046) 
-1.6 
(2.9) 
20.8 
(2.7) 
19.2 
(5.0) 
Education+ Sector (𝛑𝐫𝐞𝐞,𝐬𝐫𝐬𝐬𝐫𝐫) 0.711 (0.035) 0.177 (0.048) 21.0 (4.5) 20.8 (4.0) 41.9 (7.0) 
All Explanatory Variables (𝑿,𝒁) 0.672 (0.026) 0.137 (0.037) 34.0 (5.9) 20.8 (4.5) 54.9 (7.6) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are bootstrap standard errors (250 replications). Bolded numbers identify 
the main driving forces of the rise in inequality.  
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CHAPTER III Market Transition, Industrialization, and Social Mobility Trends in Post-
Revolution China 
Sociologists have long sought to understand how political institutions shape social stratification. 
In particular, the transition from state socialism to market capitalism in China and the former 
Eastern Bloc countries has spurred a vast volume of research on the impacts of institutional 
changes on economic inequality. Prominent in this literature is Nee’s (1989, 1991, 1996) market 
transition theory, which contends that the post-socialist transition is a process in which markets 
replace politics as the basic principle of resource allocation and thus predicts that human capital 
gradually replaces political loyalty as the main determinant of an individual’s socioeconomic 
success. Empirical assessments of market transition theory abound. The dominant line of inquiry 
has revolved around the micro-level question of how economic payoffs of human capital relative 
to political capital have evolved over time (Bian and Logan 1996; Song and Xie 2014; Zhou 
2000), differed by economic sector (Peng 1992; Rona-tas 1994; Wu and Xie 2003), or varied 
across regions at different stages of economic reform (Gerber 2002; Walder 2002; Xie and 
Hannum 1996). More recent research has also explored the implications of micro-level social 
determinants of income for macro-level inequality (Bandelj and Mahutga 2010; Hauser and Xie 
2005; Zhou 2014), which has been growing rapidly in transitional economies (Heyns 2005; Xie 
and Zhou 2014).  
So far, the market transition theory and its empirical assessments are almost exclusively 
concerned with inequalities of socioeconomic outcomes, such as income (e.g., Bian and Logan 
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1996), housing (e.g., Song and Xie 2014), and managerial positions (e.g., Walder, Li, and 
Treiman 2000), i.e., questions of intragenerational inequality. The consequences of market 
transition for inequality of opportunity—indicated by intergenerational social mobility—remain 
underexplored. In a pioneering study, Gerber and Hout (2004) report that the net association 
between class origins and class destinations strengthened following the collapse of communism 
in Russia in the 1990s, suggesting that state socialism might have been conducive to equality of 
opportunity in the former Soviet Union. Gerber and Hout’s conclusion prompts the question of 
whether social fluidity declines in general with a society transitioning from state socialism to a 
market economy. To answer this question, we need to understand trends in intergenerational 
mobility in other societies that have undergone similar transitions. A prime candidate for 
addressing this question is China. 
The question of trends in intergenerational mobility has attracted sociological attention 
for a much longer period than the market transition debate. In particular, a large literature in 
comparative stratification has been devoted to understanding the effects of economic 
development on intergenerational social mobility (Ganzeboom, Treiman, and Ultee 1991). Two 
prominent hypotheses have emerged in this literature. First, the “thesis of industrialism” predicts 
that the more industrialized a society is, the higher the degree of social fluidity (Treiman 1970: 
221). Second, in what is known as the FJH hypothesis, Featherman, Jones, and Hauser (1975) 
argue that while there may be an initial effect of economic development, improvement in social 
mobility is limited when a society becomes sufficiently industrialized. While the bulk of 
empirical work in the past has been consistent with the FJH hypothesis (Erikson and Goldthorpe 
1992; Grusky and Hauser 1984), more sensitive tests of trends in the form of the “Unidiff” 
model (Xie 1992) suggest that social fluidity has increased in many industrialized nations over 
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the 20th century, albeit slowly (Breen and Jonsson 2007; Breen and Luijkx 2004; Vallet 2001). 
However, these two hypotheses have been challenged in a recent article by two economists 
(Long and Ferrie 2013). Using historical census data and the 1973 Occupational Changes in a 
Generation (OCG II) survey, Long and Ferrie find that intergenerational occupational mobility in 
the U.S. was much higher in the late-19th than in the mid-20th century. Considering that rapid 
industrialization in the U.S. took place between 1860 and 1930 (Xie and Killewald 2013), Long 
and Ferrie’s finding contradicts both of the two hypotheses by suggesting that social fluidity in a 
major modern society declined over its course of industrialization. Controversial as it is, Long 
and Ferrie’s study poses serious challenges to the two prominent hypotheses in sociology about 
the effect of industrialization on social mobility. 
In the current literature evaluating the industrialism thesis and the FJH hypothesis, 
industrialization is construed as the level of industrial development at a given time point for a 
given society, undifferentiated for the parents’ versus children’s generations. In other words, 
industrialization is treated as a state, not a process. While this approach is reasonable for 
comparisons of societies undergoing industrialization at similar paces, it is inadequate if there is 
a substantial variation in the pace of industrialization across societies being compared. A rapid 
pace of industrialization, net of the industrialization level, may play a direct role in promoting 
social fluidity. Indeed, a number of national studies have suggested that rapidly industrializing 
societies, such as Israel and Korea in the 1960s and 1970s, seem to exhibit relatively weak class 
boundaries, especially between agricultural and nonagricultural classes (e.g., Goldthorpe, Yaish, 
and Kraus 1997; Ishida, Goldthorpe, and Erikson 1991; Park 2003; Torche 2005). These pieces 
of evidence, however, are at best fragmentary at the present. To our knowledge, no systematic 
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effort has been made to explore the theoretical implications of the pace of industrialization for 
social mobility. 
China’s recent history provides a unique opportunity for better understanding the impacts 
of market transition and rapid industrialization on intergenerational social mobility, as the 
country has experienced striking industrial expansion as well as the demise of socialism since its 
economic reform began in 1978. This article represents our effort to exploit this opportunity. 
Using data from six waves of comparative, nationally representative surveys from 1996 to 2012, 
we analyze trends in intergenerational class mobility among Chinese men and women born 
between 1936 and 1981. We use log-linear analysis to carefully examine patterns of class fluidity 
net of changes in the marginal distribution of the Chinese class structure. In particular, we model 
three distinct dimensions of class fluidity—status hierarchy, class immobility, and affinity—and 
trace them across four birth cohorts. Besides the roles of marketization and industrialization, we 
also pay close attention to the influences of a peculiarly Chinese social institution—the 
household registration (hukou) system—that puts agricultural workers at a structural 
disadvantage by preventing them from migrating to and settling down permanently in cities (Wu 
and Treiman 2004). 
We further interpret temporal trends in social fluidity in China within an international 
context by comparing patterns of mobility in different Chinese cohorts with those in 12 advanced 
industrial countries analyzed in Erickson and Goldthorpe’s (1992) project, Comparative Analysis 
of Social Mobility in Industrial Nations (henceforth CASMIN). Our own comparative analysis 
involves measuring the magnitudes of social fluidity or rigidity in post-revolution China relative 
to those in more developed countries. Capitalizing on temporal trends in China as well as cross-
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national variation, we aim to understand how patterns of intergenerational social mobility may be 
affected not only by the level, but also by the pace, of industrialization.  
Theoretical and Methodological Issues 
State Socialism, Market Transition, and Class Stratification 
Class theorists have long speculated about the influences of political institutions on social 
stratification. As both Parkin (1971) and Giddens (1973) suggest, compared with liberal capitalist 
societies, state socialist regimes may exhibit less class-based stratification due to the absence of 
private property, less differentiated reward systems, and more egalitarian social policies (see also 
Szelényi 1998). This argument may well have been applicable to socialist China. First, the 
socialist state policies carried out immediately following the founding of the People’s Republic 
of China in 1949 eliminated virtually all forms of private property and effectively reduced the 
“bourgeoisie class” to a group of peddlers, shopkeepers, and self-employed artisans and 
handicraft workers, which according to our data altogether constituted less than 2% of the entire 
labor force. The abolition of inheritable property removed material obstacles to upward mobility 
for the poor as well as financial protections against downward mobility for the rich. Hence, the 
economic foundation underlying the class structure may have played a much weaker role in class 
reproduction in socialist China than in the West.  
Second, up until the end of 1980s, most urban workers in China were employed by the 
state, which imposed a rigid wage grade system that deliberately suppressed income inequality, 
both within and between occupational classes. Thus, children of different class origins had more 
equal material resources for occupational attainment than would have been the case in a highly 
unequal society. Relatively low income inequality, moreover, reduced the economic incentives 
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for elites to transmit their social advantages to their offspring. Class mobility, in other words, 
was a game of low stakes.  
 Finally, in the pre-reform era, especially during the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960) and 
the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the Chinese government vigorously pursued a set of 
egalitarian educational policies that favored the offspring of peasants, workers, and soldiers, 
including the abolition of tuition fees, dramatic expansions of primary and secondary education 
in the countryside, and an emphasis on political criteria rather than academic ability for 
admission to universities (Meisner 1999: 362-63). As a result, educational opportunities were 
greatly enhanced for socially disadvantaged groups, such as rural youth, women, and the urban 
poor (Hannum and Xie 1994; Zhou, Moen, and Tuma 1998). Since a good education, particularly 
at the post-secondary level, could lead to a managerial or professional job in the state sector, it is 
reasonable to suppose that social mobility, particularly long-range upward mobility, should have 
been higher under Chinese state socialism than in a liberal market economy.  
 Since 1978, the economic reform in China has dismantled the old system of state 
planning and embraced markets as the guiding principle of resource allocation. What is the 
implication of the market-oriented reforms for intergenerational mobility?  Earlier research has 
shown declines in class fluidity following the collapse of state socialism in Russia (Gerber and 
Hout 2004) and Hungary (Robert and Bukodi 2004). Given the experiences in Eastern Europe, 
there are good reasons to conjecture that the process of market transition may have also led to a 
less open class structure in China (Bian 2002). First, the emerging private sector has provided 
abundant opportunities for administrative elites to accumulate wealth through their political 
influence and social networks (Bian and Logan 1996; Rona-tas 1994). For instance, many 
government officials have successfully turned themselves into private entrepreneurs or become 
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patrons of private businesses formally owned by their relatives or friends (Meisner 1999: 475-
77). Since economic resources are readily inheritable, the conversion of political power into 
personal wealth has greatly facilitated the intergenerational reproduction of socioeconomic 
status, if not of occupational titles.  
Moreover, during the reform era, the Chinese government deregulated the state sector and 
its rigid reward system. Wage differentials increased substantially between professionals and 
regular workers, and among workers with differing skills (Zhou 2000). Due to the deregulation 
of wages as well as the expansion of the private sector, income inequality has soared in China 
over the past three decades (see Xie and Zhou 2014). Hence, the upper class now has both more 
resources and stronger motivation to pass their advantages on to their children. In addition, the 
populist educational policies in favor of the rural population during the Maoist era have largely 
been abandoned, and in their place is a more selective system of recruitment. Wu (2010) shows 
that during the 1990s, the effect of family background on educational attainment increased, and 
the rural-urban gap in the likelihood of transition to senior high school widened. Thus, for 
children of underprivileged families, especially those of rural origin, the prospect of long-range 
upward mobility may have become much slimmer than in the past. In light of these processes, we 
would expect that the link between class origin and class destination has tightened during 
China’s post-socialist transition, making it difficult for intergenerational mobility to occur along 
the socioeconomic hierarchy. 
Industrialism, Rapid Industrialization, and Social Mobility 
One of the earliest explanations that stratification scholars have proposed to account for trends in 
social mobility highlights the role of industrialization. The “thesis of industrialism,” in particular, 
states that industrial development should promote equality of opportunity because it entails a 
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process of economic rationalization that will shift the emphasis away from ascription to 
achievement in the allocation of social positions (Treiman 1970; see also Blau and Duncan 1967: 
chapter 12). As an integral part of industrialization, the argument goes, the spread of public 
education and the expansion of mass communications serve to reduce the economic and cultural 
barriers to movement between classes, and urbanization and greater geographic mobility tend to 
loosen ties of kinship and thus the influence of family background on occupational attainment.  
By definition, industrialization fundamentally alters the prevailing occupational structure 
and thus necessarily changes the distribution of social classes from the parental generation to the 
child generation (Duncan 1966; Sobel, Hout, and Duncan 1985). Hence, industrialization 
necessitates an increase in structural mobility. The focal quantity of interest in the comparative 
mobility literature, however, is social fluidity, i.e., relative social mobility net of overall changes 
in the class structure across generations (Featherman and Hauser 1978; Goodman 1969). Some 
national studies find upward trends in social fluidity over time (e.g., Breen 2004; Featherman 
and Hauser 1978; Ganzeboom, Luijkx, and Treiman 1989; Hout 1988; Wong and Hauser 1992). 
However, many cross-national studies (e.g., Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Grusky and Hauser 
1984; Wong 1990) have rejected the thesis of industrialism in support of a competing hypothesis 
proposed by Featherman, Jones, and Hauser (1975). In what is known as the FJH hypothesis, it is 
argued that while there may be an initial effect of economic development on mobility, relative 
mobility is largely stable and cross-nationally similar once a certain level of industrialization is 
reached.8  
                                                          
8 An antecedent of the FJH hypothesis, which did not distinguish structural mobility from social 
fluidity, was advanced by Lipset and Zetterberg (1959: 13). 
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 In both the thesis of industrialism and the FJH hypothesis, the notion of industrialization 
is construed as the level of industrial development that is roughly applicable to both generations 
in a mobility regime. This is a reasonable assumption when industrialization has run its course, 
as is the case for advanced industrial societies such as those in contemporary Western Europe 
and North America. For a rapidly industrializing society such as post-revolution China, however, 
the employment structure is likely to undergo dramatic changes from one generation to the next. 
Furthermore, the pace of industrialization may change greatly over time. In fact, the percentage 
of workers not in agriculture—a common indicator of industrialization—increased slowly in the 
first three decades of the People’s Republic, from 16% in 1952 to 31% in 1980; but by 2011, this 
figure had soared to 65% (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2012). In this paper, we adopt a 
convenient measure of the pace of industrialization as the generation gap in the proportion of 
agricultural employment, as a faster pace of industrialization is associated with a larger 
generation gap in the proportion of agricultural employment. We will show later in this paper 
that the generation gap in the proportion of agricultural employment has differed greatly across 
cohorts in post-revolution China.  
We contend that the pace of industrialization—net of the level of industrialization—may 
exert a distinct influence on occupational mobility, not only through shifts in occupational 
structure per se, but also through its effects on the relative chances of mobility into and out of the 
agricultural sector. Indeed, there is ample empirical evidence showing that the boundary between 
the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors tends to be particularly permeable in a rapidly 
industrializing society. For example, drawing on historical census data, Guest, Landale, and 
McCann (1989) discovered that, relative to the mid-20th century United States, barriers to 
entering farming were much weaker in the late-19th century U.S., when the country experienced 
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massive industrial expansion. This is in fact the primary cause for Long and Ferrie's (2013) 
finding that social mobility declined in the U.S. over the first half of the 20th century (Hout and 
Guest 2013; Xie and Killewald 2013). In the CASMIN project, Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) 
also found that, compared with Western European countries, intergenerational movement 
between the farming and nonfarming sectors was more prevalent in Hungary and Japan, two 
countries with accelerated paces of industrialization in the post-war years. There is also evidence 
that sectoral barriers are relatively weak in newly and rapidly industrializing countries, such as 
Israel (Goldthorpe et al. 1997), Korea (Park 2003), and Chile (Torche 2005). A common 
explanation, as alluded to by some of these authors, is that the process of industrialization tends 
to create a large volume of part-time farmers, or “semi-proletarians,” who take jobs in the 
industry sector but retain ties to the land either themselves or through their families, thus 
effectively straddling the agricultural and industrial sectors (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 153-
154).  
China has been on a path of rapid industrialization since the economic reform began in 
1978. Hundreds of millions of rural-urban migrant workers leave their parents and children in the 
countryside and supplement family income through various kinds of nonfarming work. More 
importantly, due to the household registration system (see the next section), rural migrant 
workers in China are denied legal urban status and the right to permanent migration to cities. The 
offspring of migrant workers in China, as a result, are highly vulnerable to downward mobility, 
i.e., becoming peasants themselves. Therefore, we would expect that net mobility between 
farming and nonfarming occupations has increased during the recent years of rapid 
industrialization and massive rural-urban migration. In our analysis, we will also draw on cross-
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national data to assess the hypothesis that a faster pace of industrialization is associated with 
greater exchange mobility between the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. 
The Hukou System and Patterns of Class Mobility in China 
In concluding the CASMIN project, Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) argued that cross-national 
differences in patterns of social fluidity were largely due to country-specific historical and 
political circumstances rather than to generic factors such as the degree of economic 
development. In China, an idiosyncratic factor shaping the structure of social mobility is the 
household registration (hukou) system. Established in the 1950s, the hukou system requires that 
all households be registered in the locales of their residence for the government to tightly control 
population mobility, especially between rural and urban areas (Wu and Treiman 2004). Further, 
children inherit their parents’ hukou status.9 
The vast majority of rural Chinese, as a result, are tied to their home villages, with little 
prospect of upward mobility. For this reason, a major dimension of social inequality in China has 
been the divide between the rural and urban populations (Xie and Zhou 2014). Still, the 
government has policies that allow a rural person to acquire an urban hukou under special 
circumstances, among which the most typical is enrollment in an institution of tertiary or 
technical education. Given the urban population’s structural advantages over the rural 
population, incentives through this channel of mobility for rural Chinese are very high (Chan and 
Zhang 1999; Wu and Treiman 2004). Since a tertiary or technical education almost surely 
confers an administrative or professional job, a large proportion of those who manage to change 
their hukou status end up in relatively high-status positions. Thus we would expect that in China, 
                                                          
9 In the case when one of the parents has an urban hukou while the other has a rural hukou, the 
child usually inherits the mother’s hukou (Chan and Zhang 1999).  
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those few individuals who have successfully moved out of agriculture intergenerationally will be 
well represented in the upper echelon of the socioeconomic hierarchy. 
 Interestingly, previous research also reveals that reverse mobility from the professional 
and managerial class to the agriculture class has also been particularly common in China (Cheng 
and Dai 1995; Wu and Treiman 2007). To explain this phenomenon, Cheng and Dai (1995) 
pointed to the policy of rustication during the Maoist era: two waves of “send-down” campaigns 
before and during the Cultural Revolution forced tens of millions of urban youths, especially the 
offspring of urban intellectuals and bureaucrats, to go to the countryside and labor in the fields. 
Wu and Treiman (2007) nonetheless discounted this explanation by pointing out that most urban 
youths who were sent down had returned to the cities by the 1980s. Instead, they suggest that the 
long-range downward mobility back to agriculture is also a unique product of the hukou system. 
Specifically, children of rural cadres are likely to become peasants themselves because 
opportunities to obtain nonagricultural work, either white collar or blue collar, are scarce in the 
countryside. In other words, the hukou system, combined with a rural occupational structure 
composed mostly of a vast peasantry and a small group of village cadres, has led to 
disproportionate amounts of exchange mobility between the agricultural and the 
professional/managerial classes. 
  The hukou system may have also produced a structural affinity between agriculture and 
self-employment. While private property ownership, as noted earlier, was officially outlawed in 
pre-reform China, this restriction on private property was effectively enforced mostly in urban 
areas, where the government had the economic power to employ all urban workers and the 
administrative capacity to disallow private businesses. As a result, a small number of rural 
Chinese were still engaged in self-employment, such as peddlers, petty shopkeepers, and self-
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employed artisans. Because they were mainly confined to rural areas and had rural hukou, their 
offspring, if occupationally mobile, would be more likely to enter farming than any other 
occupation. The affinity between these two groups may have become even stronger in the reform 
era. As noted by Nee (1989), although the economic reform encouraged private entrepreneurship 
from the beginning, it was the lower tiers of the social hierarchy who initially took advantage of 
the market opportunities. In rural areas, following the breakup of agricultural collectives and the 
establishment of the household responsibility system, a large number of surplus laborers that 
were freed from the production teams began to start their own businesses. In urban areas, both 
party cadres and regular state workers initially had too high a stake in the existing system to 
plunge into the precarious private sector. As a result, the vast majority of private entrepreneurs in 
the early phase of the economic reform also came from marginalized social groups, particularly 
rural-urban migrants (Wu and Xie 2003; Wu 2006). However, because the core of the hukou 
system has been left largely intact since the market reform, the offspring of these early 
entrepreneurs faced little chance of entering the formal urban economy, and many ended up 
becoming peasants again, constituting a pattern of reverse mobility from self-employment to 
farming. 
 From the above discussion, we would expect that due to the institutional segregation of 
the rural and urban populations, class mobility in China has been shaped by disproportionate 
flows between farming and the managerial/professional class, and between farming and self-
employment. In the analysis that follows, we incorporate these two patterns of affinity into 
models of class fluidity and its trends. Moreover, we use cross-national data to test whether these 
affinities are truly unique to contemporary China or shared by other countries as part of a general 
mobility regime.  
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Social Mobility as a Multidimensional Process 
The earlier discussion suggests that trends in social fluidity in China’s recent history have been 
influenced by two opposing social forces: on the one hand, social fluidity may have declined due 
to the demise of state socialism; on the other hand, social fluidity may have been facilitated by 
rapid industrial expansion. It seems that these two effects may have offset each other to a degree 
at which neither can be empirically detected. This is not necessarily the case, however, because 
social mobility is a multidimensional process and can be understood as such (Hout 1984; Wong 
1992). It is true that intergenerational data, including those analyzed in this paper, are typically 
two-way cross-classifications (𝐹𝑟𝑖) of social origin, i.e., parental class/occupation status (𝑖 =1, … 𝐼), by social destination, i.e., children’s class/occupation status (𝑗 = 1, … 𝐽). Typically, 𝐼 = 𝐽 
if the same measurement is applied for both social origin and destination. However, because 
there are multiple categories in the measurement of origin and destination (i.e., 𝐼 = 𝐽 > 2), 
multiple latent dimensions of association between origin and destination can be exploited in such 
two-way tables (Goodman 1979; Hauser 1980). 
Our earlier discussion suggests that market transition and industrialization affect social 
mobility differently, not only in the overall direction of reducing versus increasing social fluidity 
but also in weakening or enhancing specific flows of social mobility: While market transition 
reduces social fluidity by making intergenerational mobility along status hierarchy more 
difficult, rapid industrialization promotes social fluidity by weakening the barrier between the 
farming and nonfarming sectors. As we will show, these two effects can be separately modeled in 
a two-way mobility table via log-linear analysis. 
Of course, this is not the first study to investigate trends in social mobility in China. 
Using data collected from six selected provinces, Cheng and Dai (1995) showed that relative 
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chances of mobility between different class origins had been largely stable throughout China’s 
state socialist era. More recently, drawing on data from two nationally representative surveys, 
Chen (2013) also found little evidence for either an upward or a downward trend in social 
fluidity during the reform era. Neither of these studies, however, attended to the multiple 
dimensions of class fluidity and changes therein; in fact, their assessments of temporal trends 
were both based on the Unidiff model (Xie 1992), which hinges on the strong assumption that 
different dimensions of class fluidity, such as status hierarchy and sectoral barrier, would change 
in exact proportion to one another over time. If this assumption does not hold true, it may lead 
researchers to overlook the theoretically important changes we discussed earlier. Our study 
relaxes this assumption by examining how the different dimensions of class fluidity have 
evolved separately over time. As we will show, recent trends in class fluidity are simultaneously 
characterized by a strengthened status hierarchy and a weakened sectoral barrier—a finding that 
has eluded previous studies that inadequately encapsulated multidimensional changes in a single 
indicator.  
Gender and Trends in Social Mobility 
Many national studies on social mobility trends have relied on male samples only (e.g., 
Featherman and Hauser 1978 for the United States; Goldthorpe et al. 1997 for Israel; Park 2003 
for Korea; Torche 2005 for Chile), primarily because female labor force participation may have 
been differentially selective over time in those societies. When women’s labor force participation 
rate is low, as was the case in many western countries, women of upper class origins are more 
likely to stay out of the labor force than women of lower class origins because the former are 
more likely to be married to husbands with high incomes (Fligstein and Wolf 1978; Hauser, 
Featherman, and Hogan 1977). In the past four decades in western countries such as the U.S., 
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women’s labor force participation has significantly increased, along with their educational 
attainment, commitment to career jobs, and financial contributions to families (Bianchi, 
Robinson, and Milke 2006; Blau, Brinton, and Grusky 2006; DiPrete and Buchmann 2013).  If 
women’s non-participation in the labor market is selective, it is evident that the strength of this 
selection has changed over the period when women’s labor force participation has significantly 
increased. Hence, it would be difficult to disentangle real changes in social fluidity among 
women from changes in the selectivity of their labor force participation. As a result, it is difficult 
to compare trends in intergenerational mobility for men with those for women.  
 However, leaving women out of analysis is a convenience, but not a solution. Ideally, we 
would want to track trends in intergenerational mobility for both men and women, as all relevant 
theories on trends in intergenerational social mobility, as we discussed earlier, are equally 
applicable for both men and women. We thus expect similar trends by gender. For the present 
study, if trends in class fluidity in China differed significantly between men and women, it would 
severely undermine our theoretical interpretation of the findings at the societal level. Fortunately, 
the problem of selectivity for women’s labor force participation is relatively minor for post-
revolution China, where female labor force participation has been consistently high compared 
with other societies (Bauer et al. 1992). In the United States, for example, the labor force 
participation rate among women at ages 25–54 increased from 45% in 1965 to 75% in 2005, 
whereas the same indicator for China stayed around 85% throughout this period (Bauer et al. 
1992; International Labour Organization 2014; Mosisa and Hipple 2006). Therefore, in the 
following analysis, we report results for both men and women and discuss gender differences 
when they appear.  
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Data and Measures 
Data for this study come from six nationally representative sample surveys: the 1996 survey of 
Life Histories and Social Change in Contemporary China (henceforth LHSCCC 1996) and five 
waves of Chinese General Social Survey (henceforth CGSS) conducted in 2005, 2006, 2008, 
2010, and 2012. These surveys are highly comparable from design to implementation (Bian and 
Li 2012; Treiman and Walder 1998). First, all these surveys employed a standard multistage 
sampling design under which one adult was randomly selected from each sampled household. 
Moreover, in both LHSCCC 1996 and CGSS, the fieldwork was implemented by the same 
organization: the Department of Sociology at Renmin University of China. In this study, the six 
samples were pooled to form a single data file by extracting information on gender, age, current 
job, the father’s job at the time when the respondent was 14 (18 for CGSS 2006) years old, and 
sampling weights. To track trends over cohorts from the repeated cross-sectional data, we assume 
that a typical worker would hold a steady job that is likely to last for lifetime. This assumption is 
likely to hold true for earlier cohorts but is more problematic for recent cohorts. Earlier research 
shows that intragenerational job mobility in post-reform China is high mostly among young 
workers, relatively low by international standards, and largely between jobs with similar 
characteristics (i.e., within the same class) (Whyte and Parish 1985; Zhou, Tuma, and Moen 
1997). To be conservative, we construct our measure of social destination from one’s job at the 
age of 30 or older. Operationally, we restrict the sample to respondents who were actively in the 
labor force and between ages 31 and 64 at the time of the survey. In doing so, we aim to 
minimize life cycle effects that may confound observed trends across cohorts. We also exclude 
respondents who were born before 1936 because our analytical focus is on the post-revolution 
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period of the People’s Republic of China.10 After the elimination of a small fraction of cases with 
missing variables (less than 10%), our final sample consists of 16,045 men and 15,763 women.  
 To facilitate international comparisons, we adopt the widely used EGP class scheme to 
measure social origin and destination (Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero 1979). Specifically, 
we code occupations into a six-category version of the EGP scheme: the service class (I+II), 
routine non-manual workers (III), the petty bourgeoisie (IVa+b), skilled manual workers (V+VI), 
unskilled manual workers (VIIa), and farmers and agricultural laborers (IVc+VIIb). Table III.1 
shows its relationship with the original 10-category version proposed by Erikson et al. (1979). In 
fact, the only difference between our six-category version and the seven-category version 
adopted in the CASMIN project and most subsequent comparative studies is that self-employed 
farmers and agricultural laborers are combined in our classification. The distinction between 
these two groups is largely irrelevant in China because private ownership of land is strictly 
prohibited in both the socialist and post-socialist periods. Even in a fully capitalist society, it is 
sometimes difficult to distinguish between the two groups, given that children of self-employed 
farmers who work on their family farms are often classified as agricultural laborers before they 
inherit the land (Ishida et al. 1991). In our comparative analysis, we collapse all 7×7 tables used 
in the CASMIN project into their 6×6 versions.11  
                                                          
10 For a person born before 1936, his/her social origin—defined by the father’s occupation when 
he/she was 14—would be situated in an entirely different political regime.  
11 We also ran a global test of the four aggregations by fitting the independence model to the full 
10×10 table and the collapsed 6×6 table, respectively (Goodman 1981). Although statistically 
significant, the difference in 𝐺2 covers only 13.7% of the total row-column association 
(623/4563=13.7%). In other words, more than 85% of the association between social origin and 
destination is conveyed by the six-class version of the EGP scheme.  
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 According to our sample restriction criteria, our data consist of individuals who were 
born between 1936 and 1981. To examine temporal trends, we divide them into four birth 
cohorts: 1936–1951, 1952–1961, 1962–1971, and 1972–1981. These four birth cohorts roughly 
correspond to four cohorts who entered the labor force—around 18 years of age—during the 
1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, respectively. Although the market transition in China started as 
early as 1978, it was highly incremental and did not gather much momentum until 1992, when 
Deng Xiaoping made his famous southern tour. Thus, we may label the third cohort (1962–1971) 
as the “early reform cohort” and the fourth as the “late reform cohort.” With the six-class 
measure of social origin and destination and the definition of four cohorts, the analytical sample 
can be organized as a 6×6×4 contingency table.  
Methods and Analysis Plan 
In this study, we model multiple dimensions of class fluidity in intergenerational mobility tables, 
including status hierarchy, class immobility, and affinity, and allow them to evolve independently 
across cohorts. To achieve this goal, we first consider the “core model of social fluidity” 
advocated by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1987, 1992). Initially derived to fit data from England 
and France, the core model purports to depict a common pattern of class fluidity among all 
advanced industrial societies. It uses eight “design matrices” to characterize four types of 
effects—hierarchy, inheritance, sector, and affinity—that enhance or reduce mobility between 
specific classes. In particular, the hierarchy effects gauge the impact of status distances on the 
degree of mobility. The larger the hierarchy effects, the greater the level of vertical stratification. 
The inheritance effects capture the tendency of immobility and its variation across different 
classes. The sector effects reflect the difficulty of moving between the agricultural and 
nonagricultural sectors. Finally, the affinity effects are used to capture disproportionate amounts 
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of movement between specific classes that cannot be explained by the effects of hierarchy, 
inheritance, and sector. However, the core model was originally formulated to fit the 7×7 
mobility tables that separate out self-employed farmers from agricultural laborers. To adapt the 
core model to the six-class version of the EGP scheme, we convert the eight 7×7 design matrices 
to 6×6 matrices by removing the row and the column representing self-employed farmers, a 
category that does not formally exist in China. In this adaptation of the core model, the sector 
effect becomes redundant because it corresponds exactly to the inverse of the inheritance effect 
for the farming class.  
The core model of social fluidity, however, has been criticized for a number of its 
drawbacks (see Hout and Hauser 1992). For instance, it uses only two crossing parameters to 
represent status differences among seven classes, thus inadequately representing the fine 
gradations along the socioeconomic hierarchy. Moreover, the affinity effects seem to be 
deliberately chosen to fit the English and French data and may not reflect historical and political 
circumstances in other countries. For these reasons, we adopt a hybrid model that uses a linear-
by-linear specification to characterize the status hierarchy, six diagonal terms to identify class-
specific immobility, and four Chinese-specific affinity parameters to capture disproportionate 
flows between farmers and the service class and between farmers and the petty bourgeoisie. The 
model can be expressed by equation (1).  log𝐹𝑟𝑖 = 𝜇 + 𝜇𝑟𝑅 + 𝜇𝑖𝐶 + 𝜃𝑋𝑟𝑅𝑋𝑖𝐶 + 𝛿𝑟𝐷𝑟𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼𝑝𝑍𝑟𝑖𝑝4𝑝=1    (1) 
Here, the first three terms are used to saturate the row and column marginal distributions, and the 
parameters 𝜃, 𝛿𝑟, and 𝛼𝑝 represent the effects of hierarchy (𝑋𝑟𝑅𝑋𝑖𝐶), immobility (𝐷𝑟𝑖), and affinity 
(𝑍𝑟𝑖
𝑝 ), respectively. In the linear-by-linear specification, the row scores 𝑋𝑟𝑅 and columns scores 
𝑋𝑖
𝐶  can either be externally derived or internally estimated. In the latter case, the model is an 
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extension of the RC (II) model (Goodman 1979). Were the affinity parameters absent, equation 
(1) would correspond to a quasi-linear-by-linear model or quasi-RC (II) model.  
 In the following analysis, we first select a model that best captures the general patterns of 
class fluidity in China. We then examine trends in fluidity by allowing specific parameters of the 
selected model to vary across cohorts. In both steps, we use the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) to compare the fit of alternative models (Raftery 1995). The model with the lowest BIC is 
preferred. Furthermore, we put China in a comparative perspective by examining cross-national 
variations in different dimensions of class fluidity. Finally, we conduct two sets of sensitivity 
analyses to test whether the observed trends across cohorts are contaminated by age or period 
effects.  
Results  
Trends in Class Structure and Absolute Mobility Rates 
Given China’s vast social and economic transformation over the past few decades, it is 
instructive to examine trends in class structure and absolute mobility rates before moving on to 
the analysis of class fluidity. Figure III.1 shows the changes in the marginal distribution of class 
destinations across the four birth cohorts. Several trends are worth noting. First, although women 
were more likely to be engaged in farming than men, the proportion of agricultural employment 
declined sharply for both sexes. Industrialization gained more momentum in recent decades, as 
reflected in the steeper slope of decline from the third to the last cohort than in earlier successive 
cohorts. Second, for both men and women, the proportion of petty bourgeoisie rose steadily, 
reflecting the gradual expansion of markets since the late 1970s as well as the fact that younger 
cohorts were more likely to work in non-state sectors than older cohorts. Finally, the proportion 
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of the service class increased considerably from the third cohort to the last cohort, reflecting the 
latest technological changes and rapid growth in managerial and professional jobs.  
 Figure III.2 shows trends in absolute mobility rates, with rates of upward mobility, 
downward mobility, and immobility represented respectively by squares, circles, and triangles. 
Here we treat the six classes as ordered in the sequence as they appear in Table III.1. Thus, the 
rate of upward/downward mobility corresponds to the proportion of workers who were in a 
higher/lower class position than their fathers, and the rate of immobility corresponds to the 
proportion of workers who were in the same class as their fathers. We can see that from the 
second cohort on, the rate of upward mobility increased substantially for both men and women. 
Yet the rise in upward mobility came from a decline in class immobility rather than in downward 
mobility. In fact, rates of downward mobility have been fairly stable over time, ranging from 
10% to 15% for both sexes. Given the rapid decline in farming, as shown in Figure III.1, we may 
infer that both rising upward mobility rates and declining class immobility rates resulted mainly 
from industrialization, which moved a large proportion of the peasantry into the industrial sector. 
To test this conjecture, we excluded the farm sector from the mobility tables and recalculated the 
three rates for the 5×5 sub-tables. The results, represented in dashed lines, confirm our 
conjecture. When the farm sector is excluded, both the rise in upward mobility and the decline in 
class immobility disappear, and all three rates exhibit no more than trendless fluctuations. 
Indeed, the nonagricultural labor force is about equally divided into the three groups of upwardly 
mobile, downwardly mobile, and immobile in each cohort for both men and women.  
Patterns of Class Fluidity 
We now use log-linear analysis to assess the net effects of origin on destination, i.e., class 
fluidity. In the first step, we select a model that best depicts general patterns of fluidity in all 
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cohorts. In other words, the parameters representing origin-destination association are assumed 
to be constant across cohorts. The goodness-of-fit statistics for competing models are reported in 
the upper panel of Table III.2. Let us first consider two baseline models. First, the conditional 
independence model (model 1) saturates the two-way marginal distributions of origin-by-cohort 
and destination-by-cohort, but it stipulates that origins and destinations are independent within 
each cohort. The large 𝐺2 and BIC lead us to simply reject this naive model. The model of 
constant social fluidity (model 2) specifies that the degree of class fluidity is invariant across 
cohorts but otherwise does not constrain the form of association between origin and destination. 
It greatly improves the fit to the data, capturing all but about 3% of the origin-destination 
association (measured by 𝐺2) for both men and women. However, by saturating the row-column 
interaction, the model of constant social fluidity does not explicitly “model” patterns of 
intergenerational transmission. Yet we use it a benchmark against which more restricted models 
of cohort-invariant association are evaluated.  
 The core model of social fluidity (model 3) fits the data reasonably well, explaining most 
of the origin-destination association with only seven parameters (𝐺2=385 for men; 588.8 for 
women). But in terms of the BIC, it compares unfavorably with the model of constant social 
fluidity. As noted earlier, one of the drawbacks of the core model is that the affinity terms were 
based on peculiarities of specific Western societies, especially England and France. We next 
modify the core model to suit the Chinese case by replacing the original affinity terms with the 
four affinity terms that represent the closeness between farmers and the service class and 
between farmers and the petty bourgeoisie in China. The adapted core model (model 4) fits the 
data much better than model 3, using two more affinity parameters but explaining a much larger 
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proportion of the origin-destination association (𝐺2=211.5 for men; 252.4 for women). It is also 
preferable to the model of constant social fluidity according to the BIC.  
 Models 5–10 are different variants of the hybrid model characterized by equation (1). 
First, the quasi-RC model (model 5) combines the linear-by-linear specification with six 
diagonal terms representing the class-specific tendencies of immobility. It also uses eight 
parameters to estimate the row scores and column scores directly from the data. The BIC 
suggests that the quasi-RC model (BIC=-664.3 for men; -620 for women) should be favored over 
the original core model (BIC=-515.5 for men; -310 for women) but not over the adapted core 
model (BIC=-669.7 for men; -627.2 for women). The quasi-RC model, however, may also be 
adapted by the incorporation of the Chinese-specific affinity effects. The resultant model (model 
6) outperforms the adapted core model for women but not for men. Models 7–8 constitute the 
counterparts of models 5–6 in which equality constraints are imposed between the row scores 
and column scores such that 𝑋𝑟𝑅 = 𝑋𝑟𝐶 for each 𝑖. In other words, they stipulate that the relative 
distances between the six classes are common to origin and destination. According to the BIC, 
the adapted quasi-RC model with equality constraints (model 8) is preferable to all previous 
models for both men and women (BIC=-689.7 for men; -634.2 for women). In models 9–10, the 
row scores and column scores were derived from external sources rather than estimated from the 
mobility data. Specifically, for each origin class and destination class, we constructed a measure 
of socioeconomic status (SES) using the sample median of the International Socioeconomic 
Index (ISEI, see Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996). The numbers are shown in Table III.3. We can 
see that for both men and women, farmers and farm laborers (IVc+VIIb) exhibit the lowest 
socioeconomic status, and the service class (I+II) stands much higher than the other groups. 
Using the SES as the row and column scores, the quasi-linear-by-linear model (model 9) 
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consumes fewer degrees of freedom than the quasi-RC model, but it fits the data much worse. 
However, when we augment the quasi-linear-by-linear model with the four Chinese affinity 
parameters (model 10), the model fits the data remarkably well, exhibiting the lowest BIC among 
all models for both men and women (BIC=-717.3 for men; -649.1 for women). We thus consider 
model 10 as the model that best characterizes a general pattern of class fluidity in China.  
Besides the statistical criterion, we prefer model 10 to model 8 because the row scores 
and column scores can be more easily interpreted in the former. The fitted scores from model 8 
are also reported in Table III.3. They do not accord well with the median ISEI in ranking the six 
classes. In particular, the estimated position of farming is much higher than the actual 
socioeconomic standing of farmers and farm laborers in China. For men, farming is placed even 
higher than skilled manual work. Such an unusual scoring of EGP classes, we believe, is 
primarily a result of the hukou system, which has presented the Chinese peasantry barriers to 
ordinary channels of upward mobility along the status hierarchy, and, in a peculiar way, pulled 
them closer than most blue collar workers to the class of the petty bourgeoisie and the service 
class.  
  The parameter estimates from model 10 are shown in the first and third columns of Table 
III.4, respectively for men and women. We draw several observations from the estimates. First, 
we find that the effect of status hierarchy is greater for women than for men, which echoes 
earlier research showing a stronger association between class origin and class destination for 
women than for men in China (Chen 2013; Cheng and Dai 1995). Second, consistent with 
patterns in many other countries, farmers and farm laborers exhibit the strongest tendency of 
immobility, followed by the class of the petty bourgeoisie. By contrast, the diagonal effect is 
negative and not statistically significant for the service class, suggesting that the managerial and 
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professional elite in China do not have an additional tendency towards immobility after the 
effects of status hierarchy are taken into account. Finally, all four affinity parameters are positive 
and highly significant, affirming the affinity between farmers and the service class and between 
farmers and the petty bourgeoisie in intergenerational mobility. It is noteworthy, moreover, that 
the effect of affinitive mobility from the farming class to the service class is greater for men than 
for women, whereas the reverse—affinitive mobility from the service class to the farming 
class—appears larger for women than for men. This is likely a result of the entrenched 
patriarchal mentality in rural China that has caused widespread gender disparities in parental 
investment and thus in occupational mobility (Hannum, Kong, and Zhang 2009; Hannum 2005).  
Trends in Class Fluidity 
On the basis of model 10, we now model trends in class fluidity across cohorts. The goodness-of-
fit statistics for competing models are shown in the lower panel of Table III.2. First, we allow all 
parameters for origin-destination association—including effects of hierarchy, immobility, and 
affinity—to vary freely across cohorts, resulting in model 11. Although it fits the data much 
worse than model 10 according to the BIC, model 11 is useful in two respects. First, it serves as a 
benchmark against which more parsimonious models can be evaluated. Second, model 11 is 
equivalent to model 10 applied to the four cohorts separately. Thus we may detect important 
trends in class fluidity by comparing the parameter estimates across cohorts (shown in Table 
III.5). By doing so, we found that for both sexes, the effect of status hierarchy is considerably 
higher for the last cohort than for previous cohorts, which confirms our hypothesis that the link 
between origin and destination in socioeconomic status has tightened during the reform period. 
Second, we discovered significant variations from cohort to cohort in the effect of farm 
immobility. Specifically, immobility among farmers and farm laborers rose from the first cohort 
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to the second, and steadily declined thereafter. By contrast, neither the affinity effects nor the 
immobility effects for other classes exhibits noticeable trends beyond trendless fluctuations. 
Based on these observations, we now relax model 10 by allowing only the immobility effect for 
the farming class to be cohort-specific, and the effect of SES to differ between the first three 
cohorts and the last. The resultant model (model 12) fits the data extremely well, exhibiting a 
lower BIC than models 10 and 11 for both men and women. Moreover, for either sex, when 
compared with model 11, model 12 cannot be rejected at the 0.01 level according to the 
likelihood ratio test.  
 Finally, let us consider a Unidiff model (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Xie 1992) where 
the structure of origin-destination association is the same as that specified in model 10. Under 
this model, the effects of hierarchy, immobility, and affinity are allowed to change in proportion 
to one another across cohorts (model 13). Compared with model 10, the Unidiff model fits the 
data fairly well, accounting for a sizeable portion of 𝐺2 using only three degrees of freedom 
(Δ𝐺2=30.5 for men, 27.9 for women). However, the BIC suggests that it is less favorable than 
model 12. The last row of Table III.2 reports the cohort-specific layer effects estimated under the 
Unidiff model, where a normalization constraint is applied such that the layer effect for the first 
cohort equals 1. We can see that for both men and women, the layer effect rises from cohort 1 to 
cohort 2 and falls thereafter, implying an inverted U-shaped trend in the overall origin-
destination association. This trend, it should be noted, perfectly mirrors the inverted U-shaped 
trend in the effect of farming class immobility revealed by model 11, suggesting that the 
estimated layer effects of the Unidiff model may be predominantly driven by the trends in 
agricultural inheritance. In fact, when the farm-farm diagonal cells are blocked from the data, the 
Unidiff model does not yield significant variations by cohort (not shown). Hence, we prefer 
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model 12 to the Unidiff model not only because it is more probable according to Bayesian 
statistics but also because it enables us to disentangle two distinct trends in class fluidity that 
may be masked under a catch-all strength measure of origin-destination association.  
 We present the parameter estimates of model 12 in the second and fourth columns of 
Table III.4, for men and women respectively. On one hand, the interaction term between SES and 
cohort 4 indicates that the role of status hierarchy in class fluidity has significantly strengthened 
during the reform period: for both sexes, the estimated coefficient of SES is more than 50% 
larger for the late reform cohort (1972–1981) than for the previous three cohorts. To illustrate the 
tightening of the origin-destination link along the socioeconomic dimension, Figure III.3 plots 
the relationship between origin SES and the expected odds of entering the service class relative 
to the unskilled manual class under model 12 for the early reform cohort (1962–1971, shown in 
squares) and the late reform cohort (1972–1981, shown in circles). For both men and women, the 
circled line is consistently above the squared line, meaning that across the board, the odds of 
becoming a professional or manager relative to an unskilled manual worker increased from the 
third cohort to the last cohort. This overall shift reflects the rising proportion of service class jobs 
from the third to the last cohort as shown in Figure III.1. More importantly, for both sexes, the 
circled line exhibits a steeper slope than the squared line, suggesting an increase in the effect of 
origin SES on occupational attainment from the early reform period (around the 1980s) to the 
late reform period (since the 1990s). Therefore, we find strong support for our hypothesis that the 
link between origin and destination, especially along the socioeconomic dimension, has 
strengthened during China’s transition from state socialism to a market economy. In addition, it 
should be noted that the boost in the odds at the very low end of origin SES in Figure III.3 results 
from the affinity effect between the farming and the service classes estimated under model 12.  
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On the other hand, model 12 allows the diagonal effect for the farming class to vary from 
cohort to cohort. Echoing results from the cohort-specific analyses (model 11), Table III.4 shows 
that class immobility among farmers and farm laborers declined sharply from the second cohort 
to the last cohort. That is, the sectoral barrier between farming and nonfarming occupations has 
become increasingly weaker over the past three decades. Given that industrialization and rural-
urban migration have sped up in China during the same period, this finding accords with our 
hypothesis that exchange mobility between the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors tends to 
be higher in a rapidly industrializing society than under more stable economic conditions. It 
would be premature, however, to draw a causal inference based on temporal association in a 
single country. In the next subsection, we use cross-national data to examine more systematically 
the relationship between the pace of industrialization and the strength of the sectoral barrier to 
intergenerational mobility.  
We also find a relatively low level of farm immobility for the first cohort (1936–1951). 
Detailed analyses of class-specific rates of outflow revealed that this is due to a particularly high 
rate of entry into agriculture from other classes in the first cohort (not shown). We think that this 
unusual flow of workers from nonfarming origin to farming destination is attributable to several 
historical episodes during the early years of the People’s Republic of China. First, the rural 
collectivization in the mid-1950s eliminated a vibrant commercial economy in the Chinese 
countryside, and, as a result, tens of millions of petty traders and self-employed craftsmen were 
transformed into land-bound peasants. Second, in the late 1950s, the campaign of the Great Leap 
Forward created an upsurge in rural industrial employment, especially in small-scale factories 
producing agricultural implements, fertilizers, and other consumer goods. However, since these 
factories were mostly inefficient and short-lived, many rural industrial workers were dismissed 
 74 
 
and turned back to farming in the early 1960s. In addition, due to the establishment of the hukou 
system in 1958, a large volume of rural-urban migrant workers were forcibly sent back to their 
home villages in the late 1950s and early 1960s. A combination of these processes may have 
introduced substantial intragenerational mobility into agriculture from the 1950s to the early 
1960s. Considering that the members of the first cohort were born between 1936 and 1951 and 
that their class origins are defined as their fathers’ occupations when they were 14 years old, their 
relatively high rate of entry into agriculture is likely a result of the high intragenerational 
mobility into farming experienced by their fathers.  
China in Comparative Perspective 
The above analyses have shown that trends in class fluidity in China are characterized by (1) a 
strengthened status hierarchy, (2) a weakened barrier between the agricultural and 
nonagricultural sectors, and (3) relatively stable levels of affinity between farmers and the 
service class and between farmers and the petty bourgeoisie. We now put these trends in a 
broader context by comparing China with the 12 countries covered by the CASMIN project: 
Australia, England, France, West Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Northern Ireland, Poland, 
Scotland, Sweden, and the United States. It should be noted that mobility tables for these 
countries were all constructed from cross-sectional surveys in the 1970s. To compare the 
strengths of status hierarchy and class immobility in these countries with their trends in China, 
we fit a quasi-linear-by-linear model (model 9 in Table III.2) for each of the 12 countries and of 
the four Chinese cohorts. In this model, the median ISEI reported in Table III.3 are used as the 
row and column scores for all tables. The estimated effects of status hierarchy and farm 
immobility are shown in the first two columns of Table III.6. We note that while the effect of 
socioeconomic status in China has greatly strengthened in recent cohorts, it is still much weaker 
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than those in most CASMIN countries. In England, for instance, the estimated coefficient of 
hierarchy is about 20, about twice as large as that for Chinese men in the late reform cohort. The 
only country with a low socioeconomic effect comparable to China is Poland, where the 
Communist regime made a sustained effort to promote long-range social mobility in the post-war 
years (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 160).12  Thus, despite the sweeping market reforms and 
growing income inequality over the past 30 years, China today remains far more fluid along the 
socioeconomic dimension than most mature capitalist countries.  
 Further, farm immobility is lower for China’s most recent cohort than in all the other 
countries, suggesting that the barrier between the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors is 
exceptionally weak in today’s China. Moreover, the two countries that come closest to China are 
Hungary and Japan, both of which experienced rapid industrial expansion in the 1950s and 
1960s, the period right before the CASMIN data were collected. At the other extreme, the highest 
effect of farming class immobility is found in England, a country that had long completed 
industrialization before the twentieth century. These observations accord well with our 
hypothesis that the boundary between agriculture and other sectors tends to be more permeable 
in rapidly industrializing countries than in advanced industrial societies. To visualize this 
relationship, we plot in Figure III.4 the degree of farm immobility against the pace of 
industrialization among the 12 CASMIN countries as well as the four Chinese cohorts. Here, the 
effects of farm immobility are exactly the numbers shown in the second column of Table III.6, 
and the pace of industrialization is measured by the difference between the proportion of farming 
                                                          
12 Note that for all CASMIN countries, the data were collected in the 1970s. Class mobility in 
Poland may have changed significantly after the fall of communism in 1989.  
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class origins and the proportion of farming class destinations in each table.13 We can clearly see a 
negative relationship between the two: The quicker the pace of industrialization, the weaker the 
barrier between the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. Hence, cross-national comparisons 
strongly suggest that the weakening of the sectoral barrier in China over the recent cohorts is a 
product of rapid industrialization and the concomitant rural-urban migration. 
 Finally, we compare China with the 12 CASMIN countries in terms of the affinity 
between farmers and the service class and between farmers and the petty bourgeoisie, with the 
logarithm of odds ratios for two 2×2 sub-tables extracted from the original data: the 2×2 tables 
containing farmers and the service class only and the 2×2 tables containing farmers and the petty 
bourgeoisie only. The log odds ratio gauges the relative degree of immobility versus affinity. In 
other words, the smaller the log odds ratio, the greater the relative strength of affinity. Because 
directly calculated log odds ratios often suffer from large sampling errors, we adopt their 
empirical Bayes estimates (Zhou 2015), which can effectively improve estimation precision and 
the accuracy of ranking among tables. The results are reported in the last two columns of Table 
III.6. For each 2×2 table, China exhibits the lowest log odds ratio among all countries except the 
United States, in which the log odds ratio between farmers and the petty bourgeoisie is lower 
than in China. The two patterns of affinity, therefore, are in large measure distinctively Chinese 
phenomena. As discussed earlier, they are unique products of the Chinese household registration 
system, which has unintentionally yet significantly distorted the channel of intergenerational 
mobility into and out of peasantry.  
                                                          
13 This difference is not an optimal measure of generational change in the share of agricultural 
employment because it does not take into account differential fertility and mortality between 
farming and nonfarming populations. It nonetheless is a reasonable proxy for the pace of 
industrialization and should serve our purpose of cross-national comparisons well. 
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Sensitivity Analysis 
In our examination of trends in class mobility, we divided the sample into four birth cohorts and 
interpreted cohort differences as resulting from forces of market transition and rapid 
industrialization over the past three decades in China. The observed trends by cohort, however, 
could also be driven by age or period effects. On the one hand, since our survey data span only 
16 years (1996–2012), cohort and age are strongly correlated in our cumulative sample. That is, 
later cohorts are likely younger than earlier cohorts. Although our analysis included only workers 
who were at least 31 years old, further life cycle effects might still have exerted an influence. On 
the other hand, cohort is associated with survey period because more recent surveys are more 
likely to cover later cohorts than earlier cohorts. Thus the observed differences by cohort could 
also be contaminated by short-term period trends from 1996 to 2012.  
Recognizing the intractability of separating out the effects of age, period, and cohort 
simultaneously, we carried out two sensitivity checks by controlling for age and period 
separately. First, given that three of the six surveys—LHSCCC 1996, CGSS 2006, and CGSS 
2008—also collected information on the respondent’s first job, we restricted our sample to these 
three data sets, recoded class destination as the respondent’s first job, and reran model 12 for the 
corresponding data. Since different workers take up their first jobs within a relatively short age 
range, potential life cycle effects that may contaminate cohort differences are minimized if not 
eliminated. The results are reported in the first two columns of Table III.7. All patterns and trends 
using data on the first job are consistent with our main results on the current job shown earlier in 
Table III.4, except that the effect of farming class immobility seems not to decline until the last 
cohort. Considering that the third cohort (1962–1971) mostly entered the labor market in the 
1980s, we may infer that the weakening of the sectoral barrier did not start until the 1990s.  
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Second, to control for period effects, we applied model 12 to data from CGSS 2010 and 
CGSS 2012 only. Since only a few respondents in the first cohort (1936–1951) were covered in 
the 2010 and 2012 surveys, we restricted the analysis to the later three cohorts. The results are 
shown in the last two columns of Table III.7. We can see that most coefficients are statistically 
significant and in the expected direction. One exception is that the effect of affinity for 
movement from farm to the service class is very small and not significantly different from zero, 
suggesting that this uniquely Chinese channel of long-range upward mobility may have been 
closed off during the most recent years. Overall, the results from these two sensitivity analyses 
are highly consistent with our main findings. We therefore stand by our cohort-based 
explanations for trends in social fluidity. 
Conclusion 
In this study, we adopt a cohort perspective to examine trends in social mobility in the People’s 
Republic of China. Absolute rates of mobility, especially of upward mobility, have grown 
substantially from the cohort born in the 1950s to that born in the 1970s. This growth, however, 
has been entirely driven by the force of industrialization—that is, the placement of an 
increasingly larger share of children of farming origin into nonfarming occupations. Trends in 
social fluidity, however, are much less clear-cut, confounded by two contradicting forces.  On the  
one hand, the influence of status hierarchy on class transmission has significantly heightened 
during China’s transition to a market economy, as reflected by a large increase (more than 50%) 
in the origin-destination association in socioeconomic status from the early reform cohort to the 
late reform cohort. On the other hand, the degree of immobility among farmers and farm laborers 
has declined sharply over the recent cohorts, suggesting that the boundary between the 
agricultural and nonagricultural sectors has become more permeable during China’s rapid 
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industrialization since the 1980s and especially in the 1990s. Characterized by a strengthened 
status hierarchy and a weakened sectoral barrier, the recent trends in class fluidity in China defy 
a unidirectional portrayal. 
 To shed more light on the institutional and economic determinants of social fluidity, we 
have placed the trends in China in an international context by comparing the four Chinese 
cohorts with cross-sections of the 12 advanced industrial countries covered in the CASMIN 
project. Three findings have emerged. First, the link between origin and destination in 
socioeconomic standing was exceptionally weak under Chinese state socialism. As a result, 
despite a consolidation of the status hierarchy during the reform period, the influence of origin 
SES on class attainment is still far weaker in today’s China than in mature capitalist countries. 
Second, cross-national comparisons reveal a strong negative relationship between the pace of 
industrialization and the strength of the sectoral barrier between farming and nonfarming 
occupations. Thus, the weakening of the sectoral barrier in China is in all likelihood a result of 
rapid industrialization and the massive rural-urban migration that has been occurring since the 
1980s. Finally, the two patterns of affinity—disproportionate flows between farmers and the 
service class and between farmers and the petty bourgeoisie—are in large measure distinctively 
Chinese phenomena, consonant with our hukou-based accounts of patterns of mobility into and 
out of peasantry.  
This study contributes to two strands of literature in social stratification. First, it provides 
new insights into the ways in which institutional transition shapes intergenerational mobility. 
While Gerber and Hout (2004) have demonstrated a decline in the overall degree of class fluidity 
following the collapse of communism in Russia, the present study emphasizes that the impact of 
market transition on social mobility is primarily through a fortification of the status hierarchy. In 
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China as well as other post-socialist countries, the emergence of markets provided abundant 
opportunities for the old elites to convert their political power into physical capital, thus making 
socioeconomic status far more inheritable than before. Meanwhile, a more market-driven reward 
system spurred a sharp increase in income inequality, thereby equipping upper-class families 
with more resources and incentives to pass their economic advantages on to their offspring. The 
abolition of egalitarian educational policies, moreover, severely limited the channel of upward 
mobility for children of socioeconomically disadvantaged families. A combination of these 
processes may well explain the consolidation of status hierarchy and its influence on social 
fluidity.  
However, we have also shown that China’s experience has markedly differed from that of 
Russia due to a counterbalancing effect of rapid industrialization.  In understanding the dual 
forces of market transition and industrialization in China, our study offers a new perspective for 
assessing the influence of industrialization on social stratification. In contrast to the thesis of 
industrialism and the FJH hypothesis, this perspective highlights the pace of industrialization—
rather than the level of industrialization—as a crucial force shaping social fluidity, especially the 
degree of relative mobility between the agricultural and nonagricultural classes. Cross-national 
evidence strongly supports our conjecture that the sectoral barrier tends to be weaker during 
periods of rapid industrialization than under more stable economic conditions. Indeed, a common 
feature shared by most, if not all, rapidly industrializing societies is the prevalence of part-time 
farmers who take advantage of opportunities for industrial employment yet retain their ties to the 
land. By straddling the agricultural and industrial sectors, these part-time farmers effectively 
weaken the role of the sectoral boundary in intergenerational class transmission. This unique 
linkage between rapid industrialization and inter-sectoral mobility has profound implications for 
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comparative stratification research, as the literature has only recently begun to go beyond the 
developed world to study newly industrialized countries in Asia and Latin America (Ishida 2008; 
Torche 2014).  
The above two contributions further illustrate that social mobility is a process of multiple 
dimensions and should be analyzed as such. Status hierarchy shapes the class destinations of 
those who move out of their class origins, class immobility reflects a degree of social closure that 
affects the likelihood of mobility per se, and the sectoral barrier gauges the extent to which 
macroeconomic structure constrains the specific flows of manpower. Although the 
multidimensionality of occupational mobility has long been recognized among stratification 
scholars (e.g., Erikson and Goldthorpe 1987; Hout 1984; Wong 1992), it has received scant 
attention in theoretical formulations that aim to explain temporal trends or spatial variations. 
Indeed, almost all existing macro-sociological explanations for variations in social fluidity across 
time and space—including hypotheses regarding industrialization, educational expansion, 
political ideology, economic inequality, and cultural exceptionalism—implicitly treated social 
fluidity as a unidimensional construct, and, as a result, so did most empirical assessments of 
these hypotheses. If, as this study suggests, different dimensions of the mobility process are 
driven by different societal forces, researchers would want to study dimension-specific patterns 
of spatial-temporal variation in social mobility. A unidimensional approach would be 
theoretically incomplete and analytically inadequate. We believe that future research on 
comparative mobility will benefit from a fuller appreciation of a multi-dimensional approach.  
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Figure III.1 Trends in Distribution of Class Destinations across the Four Cohorts. 
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Figure III.2 Trends in Absolute Mobility Rates across the Four Cohorts. 
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Figure III.3 Expected Odds on Service (I+II) relative to Unskilled Manual Work (VIIa) under model 12. 
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Figure III.4 Degree of Farm Immobility versus Pace of Industrialization among 16 Mobility Tables. 
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Table III.1 The EGP Class Scheme: Origin Version and the Six-Category Version 
Original Version Six-category Version 
I. Large proprietors, higher professionals and 
managers, I+II. The service class 
II. Lower professionals and managers 
III. Routine non-manual workers III. Routine non-manual workers 
IVa. Small proprietors with employees 
IVab. The petty bourgeoisie 
IVb. Small proprietors without employees 
V. Lower grade technicians and manual supervisors 
V+VI. Skilled manual workers 
VI. Skilled manual workers 
VIIa. Unskilled and semiskilled manual workers VIIa. Unskilled manual workers 
IVc. Self-employed farmers 
IVc+VIIb. Farmers 
VIIb. Agricultural laborers 
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Table III.2 Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Competing Models of Social Fluidity 
  Men Women 
 df 𝐺2 𝑒 BIC 𝐺2 𝑒 BIC 
Models for Patterns of Fluidity        
1. Conditional Independence 100 3901.7 0.00 2933.4 4930.5 0.00 3964.0 
2. Constant Social Fluidity 75 110.8 0.00 -615.5 144.3 0.00 -580.6 
3. Core Model  93 385.0 0.00 -515.5 588.8 0.00 -310.0 
4. Core Model with Chinese Affinity 
Parameters 91 211.5 0.00 -669.7 252.4 0.00 -627.2 
5. Quasi-RC (II) 85 158.8 0.00 -664.3 201.5 0.00 -620.0 
6. Quasi-RC (II) 
+Chinese Affinity Parameters 81 128.8 0.00 -655.6 149.7 0.00 -633.2 
7. Quasi-RC (II) with Equality 
Constraints 89 196.2 0.00 -665.6 308.8 0.00 -551.4 
8. Quasi-RC (II) with Equality 
Constraints + Chinese Affinity 
Parameters 
85 133.4 0.00 -689.7 187.3 0.00 -634.2 
9. Quasi-Linear-by-Linear 93 408.0 0.00 -492.6 587.4 0.00 -311.5 
10. Quasi-Linear-by-Linear 
+Chinese Affinity Parameters 
(Preferred model) 
89 144.5 0.00 -717.3 211.2 0.00 -649.1 
Models for Trends across Cohorts        
11. Model 10 with All Parameters 
Varying with Cohort 56 67.4 0.14 -474.9 114.5 0.00 -426.8 
12. Model 10 + Cohort-varying Farm 
Immobility + SES*Cohort 4 
(Preferred model) 
85 98.2 0.16 -724.9 165.0 0.00 -656.6 
     Model 12 vs. Model 11 31 31.2 0.46  50.5 0.015  
13. Model 10 with Unidiff 
Association by Cohort 86 114.0 0.02 -718.8 183.3 0.00 -647.9 
Layer Effects 
 𝜙1 = 1;𝜙2 = 1.33; 𝜙1 = 1;𝜙2 = 1.10; 
 𝜙3 = 1.17;𝜙4 = 1.08; 𝜙1 = 0.96;𝜙2 = 0.85; 
Note: The core model is adjusted to the six-class EGP scheme. The linear-by-linear association model 
uses the median ISEI within each origin and destination class as the corresponding row or column score. 
The Chinese affinity parameters are used to capture disproportionate flows between farmers (IVc+VIIb) 
and the service class (I+II) and between farmers (IVc+VIIb) and the petty bourgeoisie (IVab). 
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Table III.3 Median ISEI and Fitted Scores from Model 8 for Origin and Destination Classes 
 I+II III IVab V+VI VIIa IVc+VIIb 
Men       
ISEI, Origin 66 45 33 34 29 23 
ISEI, Destination 65 43 34 34 30 23 
Fitted Score 0.56 0.33 0.06 -0.10 -0.52 0.01 
Women       
ISEI, Origin 66 45 34 34 29 23 
ISEI, Destination 59 43 37 34 29 23 
Fitted Score 0.40 0.47 0.47 -0.13 -0.48 -0.32 
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Table III.4 Parameters Estimates and Fit Statistics for Model 10 and Model 12 
 Men Women 
 Model 10 Model 12 Model 10 Model 12 
Hierarchy     
SES/100 
8.36*** 7.71*** 11.45*** 10.47*** 
(1.49) (1.50) (1.47) (1.49) 
SES/100 * Cohort 4  4.17***  6.44***  (1.13)  (1.43) 
Immobility     
Service (I+II) 
-0.21 -0.23 -0.07 -0.10 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) 
Routine Non-manual (III) 
0.25* 0.25* 0.28*** 0.29*** 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) 
Petty Bourgeoisie (IVab) 
1.28*** 1.28*** 0.91*** 0.92*** 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.15) 
Skilled Manual (V+VI) 
0.67*** 0.67*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Unskilled Manual (VIIa) 
0.23** 0.23** 0.13 0.13 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
Farm (IVc+VIIb) 
2.56***  2.72***  
(0.07)  (0.07)  
Farm, Cohort 1  2.21***  2.82***  (0.12)  (0.13) 
Farm, Cohort 2  2.93***  3.03***  (0.11)  (0.10) 
Farm, Cohort 3  2.63***  2.68***  (0.10)  (0.09) 
Farm, Cohort 4  2.06***  2.01***  (0.15)  (0.14) 
Affinity     
Service to Farm 
0.97*** 0.96*** 1.27*** 1.25*** 
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) 
Farm to Service 
0.44*** 0.44*** 0.22** 0.22** 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
Petty Bourgeoisie to Farm 
0.77*** 0.71*** 0.99*** 0.90*** 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) 
Farm to Petty Bourgeoisie 
0.82*** 0.81*** 0.94*** 0.91*** 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
𝑮𝟐 144.5 98.2 211.2 165.0 
Df 89 85 89 85 
Note: †p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests). Numbers in parentheses are standard 
errors.
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Table III.5 Cohort-Specific Results for the Quasi-Linear-by-Linear Model with Chinese Affinity Parameters 
 Men Women 
 All Birth Cohorts 
1936-
1951 
1952-
1961 
1962-
1971 
1972-
1981 
All Birth 
Cohorts 
1936-
1951 
1952-
1961 
1962-
1971 
1972-
1981 
Hierarchy           
SES 
8.36*** 7.02† 6.61* 8.11*** 13.48*** 11.45*** 5.81 11.32*** 11.08*** 17.20*** 
(1.49) (3.70) (2.80) (2.45) (3.45) (1.47) (4.20) (2.73) (2.39) (3.33) 
Immobility           
Service (I+II) 
-0.21 -0.16 0.08 -0.41 -0.39 -0.07 0.29 -0.25 0.01 -0.31 
(0.15) (0.39) (0.29) (0.25) (0.35) (0.12) (0.36) (0.23) (0.19) (0.25) 
Routine Non-manual (III) 
0.25* 0.46† 0.26 0.30 -0.14 0.28*** 0.32 0.52*** 0.10 0.26 
(0.11) (0.26) (0.20) (0.19) (0.32) (0.08) (0.22) (0.15) (0.14) (0.19) 
Petty Bourgeoisie (IVab) 
1.28*** 1.88*** 1.43*** 1.07*** 1.24*** 0.91*** 0.20 1.07** 1.05*** 0.80*** 
(0.12) (0.39) (0.26) (0.21) (0.22) (0.15) (0.76) (0.35) (0.25) (0.23) 
Skilled Manual (V+VI) 
0.67*** 0.55** 0.73*** 0.61*** 0.82*** 0.38*** 0.02 0.38** 0.57*** 0.22 
(0.07) (0.18) (0.13) (0.12) (0.19) (0.08) (0.21) (0.14) (0.13) (0.22) 
Unskilled Manual (VIIa) 
0.23** 0.35† 0.31* 0.23 -0.10 0.13 -0.12 0.23 0.13 -0.04 
(0.08) (0.21) (0.14) (0.14) (0.22) (0.09) (0.28) (0.15) (0.15) (0.26) 
Farm (IVc+VIIb) 
2.56*** 2.07*** 3.12*** 2.59*** 2.05*** 2.72*** 3.11*** 3.18*** 2.64*** 1.70*** 
(0.07) (0.16) (0.14) (0.13) (0.20) (0.07) (0.19) (0.13) (0.11) (0.16) 
Affinity           
Service to Farm 
0.97*** 0.76** 1.36*** 0.75*** 1.02*** 1.27*** 1.57*** 1.48*** 1.18*** 0.77** 
(0.11) (0.27) (0.22) (0.19) (0.30) (0.11) (0.31) (0.21) (0.18) (0.28) 
Farm to Service 
0.44*** 0.33 0.45** 0.47** 0.46* 0.22** 0.08 0.25 0.33* 0.07 
(0.09) (0.21) (0.16) (0.15) (0.20) (0.08) (0.22) (0.16) (0.13) (0.18) 
Petty Bourgeoisie to Farm 
0.77*** 0.12 1.12*** 0.60† 0.91** 0.99*** 0.50 1.38*** 1.12*** 0.39 
(0.17) (0.42) (0.33) (0.31) (0.34) (0.15) (0.41) (0.28) (0.26) (0.29) 
Farm to Petty Bourgeoisie 
0.82*** 0.79*** 0.78*** 0.92*** 0.68*** 0.94*** 1.22*** 1.21*** 0.89*** 0.65*** 
(0.06) (0.22) (0.12) (0.09) (0.13) (0.07) (0.28) (0.14) (0.10) (0.13) 
𝑮𝟐 144.5 20.1 11.6 26.2 9.5 211.2 10.6 39.8 27.4 36.7 
df 89 14 14 14 14 89 14 14 14 14 
Note: †p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
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Table III.6 Cross-national Comparisons in Hierarchy, Farm Immobility, and Affinities 
 Quasi-linear-by-linear Model (without Affinity Parameters) 
Log Odds Ratios for 2×2 Subtables 
(Empirical Bayes Estimates) 
 Hierarchy Farm Immobility (Service, Farm) (Petty Bourgeoisie, Farm) 
China: Cohort 1 2.61 1.81 
2.52 2.57 
China: Cohort 2 0.62 2.52 
China: Cohort 3 5.51 1.97 
China: Cohort 4 10.35 1.40 
Australia 21.36 1.94 3.61 2.90 
England 20.47 2.99 4.65 3.75 
France 21.95 2.70 5.59 3.97 
West Germany 23.04 2.58 4.80 4.49 
Hungary 24.47 1.66 4.39 3.48 
Ireland 17.04 2.79 4.72 3.90 
Japan 15.43 1.75 3.17 3.33 
Northern Ireland 16.91 3.04 4.66 3.54 
Poland 10.13 2.38 4.89 3.47 
Scotland 19.49 3.21 4.63 3.67 
Sweden 23.94 1.85 4.38 3.01 
USA 19.18 1.99 3.87 2.38 
Note: Results in this table are for men only. The quasi-linear-by-linear model uses the median ISEI 
presented in Table III.3 as the row and column scores for all tables.  
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Table III.7 Parameters Estimates and Fit Statistics for model 12 under Alternative Specifications 
 First Job 2010+2012 Data Only 
 Men Women Men Women 
Hierarchy     
SES 
12.21*** 11.62*** 8.94** 16.50*** 
(2.73) (2.38) (2.92) (2.36) 
SES*Cohort 4 2.69† 4.70** 5.55* 5.41* (1.63) (1.69) (2.17) (2.59) 
Immobility     
Service (I+II) 
-0.65* -0.33 -0.18 -0.13 
(0.31) (0.24) (0.21) (0.15) 
Routine Non-manual (III) 
0.81*** 0.96*** 0.23 0.10 
(0.19) (0.14) (0.19) (0.13) 
Petty Bourgeoisie (IVab) 
1.73*** 1.68*** 1.27*** 0.78*** 
(0.25) (0.27) (0.16) (0.19) 
Skilled Manual (V+VI) 
0.58*** 0.12 0.61*** 0.10 
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.15) 
Unskilled Manual (VIIa) 
0.25* 0.01 0.32* 0.09 
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) 
Farm, Cohort 1 
2.11*** 2.86***   
(0.15) (0.17)   
Farm, Cohort 2 2.30*** 2.83*** 2.78*** 3.00*** (0.14) (0.14) (0.17) (0.16) 
Farm, Cohort 3 2.59*** 2.83*** 2.36*** 2.27*** (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.14) 
Farm, Cohort 4 2.27*** 2.26*** 1.89*** 2.16*** (0.19) (0.18) (0.20) (0.19) 
Affinity     
Service to Farm 
0.67*** 1.03*** 0.68*** 1.20*** 
(0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.16) 
Farm to Service 
1.21*** 0.65*** 0.03 0.01 
(0.16) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) 
Petty Bourgeoisie to Farm 
0.45* 0.36 0.92*** 1.18*** 
(0.23) (0.25) (0.25) (0.20) 
Farm to Petty Bourgeoisie 
0.83*** 1.07*** 0.71*** 0.93*** 
(0.16) (0.15) (0.09) (0.10) 
𝑮𝟐 137.4 162.1 53.1 127.5 
Df 85 85 61 61 
Note: †p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
Data source: LHSCCC 1996, CGSS 2006, CGSS 2008 for left panel; CGSS 2010, CGSS 2012 for right 
panel.  
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CHAPTER IV Shrinkage Estimation of Log Odds Ratios for Comparing Mobility Tables 
Comparative mobility analysis has long been at the core of social stratification research. To 
investigate how patterns of intergenerational mobility differ across countries or vary over time, 
stratification researchers typically compare a collection of mobility tables that cross-classify 
fathers and sons by their occupations or classes. To draw such comparisons, researchers until the 
1970s had relied on simple calculations of inflow and outflow rates (e.g., Lipset and Zetterberg 
1956; Miller 1960) or the construct of “mobility ratios” (e.g., Glass and Berent 1954; Rogoff 
1953), both of which turned out to be inadequate to separate changes in relative mobility (also 
known as exchange mobility, circulation mobility, or social fluidity) from changes in marginal 
distributions (i.e., structural mobility).14 Beginning in the late 1960s, thanks to the pioneering 
work of Leo Goodman (1968, 1969), it has been recognized that all associations in an 𝐼 × 𝐽 
contingency table can be captured by a sufficient set of (𝐼 − 1)(𝐽 − 1) odds ratios.15 This 
fundamental discovery paved the way for the subsequent development of log-linear and log-
multiplicative models (e.g., Duncan 1979; Goodman 1979; Hauser 1980), in which the natural 
logarithms of odds ratios are expressed as regression coefficients or their linear combinations.  
Given the centrality of odds ratios in depicting the structure of row-column association, a 
natural approach to comparing mobility tables, as suggested by Goodman (1969), is to directly 
                                                          
14 The inadequacy of mobility ratio as a measure of association has been discussed by Blau and 
Duncan (1967, p.93-97), Tyree (1973), Hauser (1980, p.426-430), and Hout (1983, p.17-18). 
15 Typically, the same occupational classification is used for origin and destination, i.e., fathers 
and sons. In this case, 𝐼 =  𝐽. 
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compare their corresponding (log) odds ratios in search of similarities and differences. Although 
mobility studies in sociology have been dominated by log-linear modeling since the 1970s, this 
older model-free approach has its own appeal because it allows a panoramic view of the 
association between origin and destination without invoking parametric assumptions (see Hout 
and Guest [2013] for an illustration). Meanwhile, using log odds ratios as building blocks, 
Altham (1970) proposed a number of aggregate measures of association for comparing 
contingency tables. One of these measures (see the section Adjusted Estimation of the Altham 
Index) has been recently employed to examine long-term trends in occupational mobility in 
Great Britain and the United States (Ferrie 2005; Long and Ferrie 2007, 2013).  
Unlike log-linear modeling, the model-free approach to comparing mobility tables 
imposes no parametric constraints on the pattern of association between origin and destination. 
Instead, it requires that every log odds ratio be estimated separately from data. Estimation of 
single log odds ratios, however, can be highly imprecise in practice. Indeed, the usual maximum 
likelihood estimator (MLE) of the log odds ratio— that is, log 𝑟11𝑟22
𝑟12𝑟21
—will be accompanied by a 
large standard error unless all of the associated cells contain many cases,16 a condition that often 
fails for real mobility tables. As a result, direct comparisons in sample log odds ratios across 
tables are prone to conflate true variations in relative mobility with sampling fluctuations. On the 
one hand, if relative mobility is constant and trendless in all complex societies, as implied by the 
hypothesis of constant social fluidity (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Featherman, Jones, and 
Hauser 1975; Grusky and Hauser 1984), the observed differences will stem entirely from 
                                                          
16 This observation derives from the fact that an estimated variance of the sample log odds ratio 
can be expressed as 1 𝑛11� + 1 𝑛12� +  1 𝑛21� + 1 𝑛22�  (Agresti 2002, p.71). See also the next 
section. 
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sampling and measurement errors. On the other hand, if social fluidity does differ across 
countries and change over time, sampling variability may also contaminate empirical 
comparisons between mobility regimes. In particular, when the set of mobility tables under 
investigation vary greatly in sample size, the relatively sparse tables are more likely to be 
estimated at the extremes of the mobility spectrum because they are subject to larger sampling 
errors. Because sample size is presumably unrelated to the true amount of social fluidity, this 
statistical artifact may distort the rank order of mobility regimes in the size of origin-destination 
association. Such a distortion can be substantively significant unless sampling errors are 
negligible relative to systematic variations among mobility regimes. The latter condition, 
unfortunately, seldom holds in comparative mobility research.  
In log-linear modeling, estimation uncertainty is partly alleviated through parametric 
assumptions. For example, the constant social fluidity (CSF) model assumes no cross-table 
variation in all log odds ratios, and the Unidiff model (Xie 1992; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992) 
stipulates that the relative magnitudes of different log odds ratios are uniform in all tables. These 
assumptions, however, may accord poorly with real data. In this paper, I propose a shrinkage 
method for estimating log odds ratios that attempts to enhance estimation efficiency without 
explicitly constraining the patterns of row-column association. Building on an empirical Bayes 
model (Efron and Morris 1973; Fay and Herriot 1979), the shrinkage estimator “borrows strength” 
across multiple tables while placing no restrictions on the structure of association within tables. 
As I will show by simulation, the shrinkage method leads to lower total squared errors than does 
the usual MLE of the log odds ratio. More important, when tables vary greatly in sample size—a 
situation that we often encounter in comparative mobility analysis— the shrinkage estimates 
exhibit markedly higher correlations with the true log odds ratios than do the usual estimates. 
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Therefore, the shrinkage method can enhance the accuracy of cross-table comparisons in the 
degree of row-column association. Moreover, the shrinkage estimates of log odds ratios can be 
used to calculate summary measures of association that are based on aggregations of log odds 
ratios. To illustrate this point, I construct an adjusted estimator of the Altham index (Altham 
1970; Altham and Ferrie 2007), and, with a set of calibrated simulations, demonstrate its 
usefulness in enhancing both the precision of individual estimates and the accuracy of cross-table 
comparisons. Finally, using two sets of real mobility tables, I show that in gauging the overall 
degree of social fluidity, the adjusted estimates of the Altham index agree more closely with 
results from the Unidiff model than do direct estimates of the Altham index. 
Shrinkage Estimation of Log Odds Ratios 
Usual Estimator of the Log Odds Ratio 
Let us consider 𝐾 2 × 2 contingency tables, which, say, cross-classify fathers and sons according 
to nonmanual and manual classes in 𝐾 countries. Denoting by 𝑛𝑟𝑖𝑢 the cell frequency pertaining 
to the 𝑖th row and the 𝑗th column in country 𝑘, the observed log odds ratios for these tables can 
be expressed as 
𝑌𝑢 = log 𝑟11𝑘𝑟22𝑘𝑟12𝑘𝑟21𝑘 ,   𝑘 = 1,2,⋯𝐾 .    (1) 
Assuming a multinomial sampling distribution for each country, these sample log odds ratios are 
also the maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) of population log odds ratios.17 They are 
therefore asymptotically normal—that is, 
�𝑛++𝑢(𝑌𝑢 − 𝜃𝑢) 𝑒→ 𝑁(0,𝑉𝑢), 
                                                          
17 The same conclusion holds when the sampling distribution is Poisson or product-multinomial. 
See Powers and Xie (2008, p.79-80). 
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where 𝑛++𝑢 and 𝜃𝑢 represent the sample size and the population log odds ratio for country 𝑘. 
Using the delta method, it is not hard to show that the asymptotic variance of 𝑌𝑢 is  
𝜎𝑢
2 = 𝑉𝑘
𝑟++𝑘
= 1
𝑟++𝑘𝜋11𝑘
+ 1
𝑟++𝑘𝜋12𝑘
+ 1
𝑟++𝑘𝜋21𝑘
+ 1
𝑟++𝑘𝜋22𝑘
 , 
where the 𝜋𝑟𝑖𝑢’s denote the unknown cell probabilities (Agresti 2002:75–76). 
Substituting the observed proportions for the 𝜋𝑟𝑖𝑢’s, we obtain a sample estimate of 𝜎𝑢2 : 
𝜎𝑢
2� = 1
𝑟11𝑘
+ 1
𝑟12𝑘
+ 1
𝑟21𝑘
+ 1
𝑟22𝑘
 .    (2) 
Because there is a finite, however small, probability that any of the four cells are zero, the 
observed log odds ratio (1) may equal ∞ or −∞. In such cases, a common practice is to add one-
half to all of the four cell frequencies, yielding a modified estimator (Agresti 2002:71) 
𝑌𝑢� = log (𝑟11𝑘+0.5)(𝑟22𝑘+0.5)(𝑟12𝑘+0.5)(𝑟21𝑘+0.5) . 
Haldane (1956) shows that this modification reduces the sampling bias from the order of 
𝑂(𝑛−1) to the order of 𝑂(𝑛−2). Moreover, Gart and Zweifel (1967) note that the corresponding 
variance estimator 
𝜎𝑢
2� = 1
𝑟11𝑘+0.5 + 1𝑟12𝑘+0.5 + 1𝑟21𝑘+0.5 + 1𝑟22𝑘+0.5  
is an unbiased estimator of Var(𝑌𝑢� ) except for terms of 𝑂(𝑛−3). I therefore adopt these 
adjustments in the case of zero cells throughout the rest of the paper.18 
Since the observed log odds ratio (1) coincides with the MLE, it is consistent and 
asymptotically efficient. Nonetheless, the asymptotic variance estimator (2) indicates that the 
                                                          
18 Clogg and Eliason (1987) noted that the practice of adding constants to all cells tends to shrink 
the data toward equiprobability. As we will see, this problem will be less relevant for the 
shrinkage estimator because the modified sample estimate 𝑌𝑢 is unlikely to receive much weight 
when there are zero cells. 
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MLE can be highly imprecise in small samples: Unless all of the four cells contain many cases, 
the standard error will be very large. As a result, if we directly compare the observed log odds 
ratios from different tables, those from relatively sparse tables will be more likely to be ranked at 
the extremes. This is undesirable because sample size is presumably unrelated to the true degree 
of association. The shrinkage approach I present below aims to improve both the precision of 
estimates from sparse tables and the accuracy of ranking among different mobility regimes. 
Empirical Bayes Shrinkage 
To explicate the shrinkage approach, let us first accept the normal approximations of the 
observed log odds ratios—that is,  
𝑌𝑢|𝜃𝑢 ∼𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑝 𝑁(𝜃𝑢,𝜎𝑢2�).    (3) 
Now consider a Bayes model where the population log odds ratios themselves follow a normal 
prior  
𝜃𝑢 ∼
𝑟.𝑟.𝑒.  𝑁(𝜇, 𝜏2),    (4) 
where 𝜇 and 𝜏2 are hyperparameters representing the prior mean and the prior variance of the 
unknown 𝜃𝑢’s. It is easy to show that the posterior distribution of 𝜃𝑢 is also normal, and the 
Bayes estimator, i.e., the posterior mean, can be written as 
𝐸(𝜃𝑢|𝑌𝑢) = 𝜇 + (1 − 𝜎𝑘2�𝜏2+𝜎𝑘2�)(𝑌𝑢 − 𝜇) .  (5) 
Estimating the hyperparameters 𝜇 and 𝜏2 directly from the data, say, through maximizing the 
marginal likelihood, leads to an empirical Bayes estimator (Efron and Morris 1973, 1975) 
𝜃�𝑢
EB = ?̂? + (1 − 𝜎𝑘2�
𝜏2�+𝜎𝑘
2�)(𝑌𝑢 − ?̂?) .  (6) 
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In the statistics literature, 𝜃�𝑢EB has been described as a shrinkage estimator because it “shrinks” 
the observed outcome 𝑌𝑢 toward the estimated prior mean ?̂? with a shrinkage factor of  
𝜎𝑘
2�
𝜏2�+𝜎𝑘
2� . 
The shrinkage factor, clearly, depends on the precision of the observation 𝑌𝑢: the larger is the 
sampling variance 𝜎𝑢2�  , the stronger is the degree of shrinkage. Indeed, the empirical Bayes 
estimator can be expressed as a precision-weighted average between 𝑌𝑢 and ?̂? (Raudenbush and 
Bryk 1985, 2002): 
𝜃�𝑢
EB = 1 𝜏2�⁄
1 𝜏2�⁄ +1 𝜎𝑘
2�⁄
?̂? + 1 𝜎𝑘2�⁄
1 𝜏2�⁄ +1 𝜎𝑘
2�⁄
𝑌𝑢 , 
where the weight accorded to 𝑌𝑢 is proportional to its sampling precision 1 𝜎𝑢2�⁄  and the weight 
accorded to ?̂? is proportional to 1 𝜏2�⁄ , a measure of the concentration of the unknown 𝜃𝑢’s 
around the prior mean 𝜇. 
Since the shrinkage factor in the posterior mean (5) is a convex function of the prior 
variance 𝜏2, a substitution of a nearly unbiased estimate 𝜏2� for 𝜏2 would produce an upward bias 
for the shrinkage factor 𝜎𝑘
2�
𝜏2+𝜎𝑘
2�  (by Jensen’s inequality). To alleviate this problem, Morris (1983) 
suggested that the estimator (6) be replaced by  
𝜃�𝑢
EB = ?̂? + [1 − (𝐾−3)𝜎𝑘2�(𝐾−1)�𝜏2�+𝜎𝑘2��](𝑌𝑢 − ?̂?) ,  (7) 
where the multiplying constant 𝐾−3
𝐾−1
 is used to offset the bias of 𝜎𝑘
2�
𝜏2�+𝜎𝑘
2�  as an estimate of the 
shrinkage factor 𝜎𝑘
2�
𝜏2+𝜎𝑘
2�   . 
The empirical Bayes framework sketched above was initially proposed by Efron and 
Morris (1973; 1975) to interpret the James-Stein rule for estimating multivariate normal means. 
Indeed, Stein (1956) and James and Stein (1961) discovered that for simultaneous estimation of 
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unrelated normal means, the usual MLE (i.e., 𝑌𝑢’s) can be inadmissible and dominated by a 
shrinkage estimator similar in form to the empirical Bayes estimator (7). On the other hand, the 
empirical Bayes method closely parallels the notion of best linear unbiased prediction (BLUP) in 
random effects models (Robinson 1991). Specifically, when both the prior variance 𝜏2 and the 
sampling variances 𝜎𝑢2 are known, it can be shown that the following statistic minimizes the 
mean squared error between 𝜃𝑢 and any unbiased estimator of 𝜃𝑢 that is linear in the 𝑌𝑢’s 
(Harville 1976): 
𝜃�𝑢
BLUP = ?̂? + (1 − 𝜎𝑘2
𝜏2+𝜎𝑘
2)(𝑌𝑢 − ?̂?) . (8) 
Here ?̂? =  ∑ 𝑤𝑢𝑌𝑢𝐾𝑢=1 ∑ 𝑤𝑢𝐾𝑢=1⁄  is the minimum variance unbiased estimator (MVUE) of 𝜇, 
where 𝑤𝑢 = 1 (𝜏2 + 𝜎𝑢2)⁄ . Replacing the variance components 𝜏2 and 𝜎𝑢2 with their estimates 
would yield the empirical best linear unbiased predictor (EBLUP) of 𝜃𝑢, which coincides with 
the empirical Bayes estimator (7) except for the lack of the multiplying constant 𝐾−3
𝐾−1
. 
While the theoretical work by James and Stein (1961) demonstrates the advantage of 
shrinkage in a fixed effects world, the concepts of BLUP and EBLUP justify the empirical Bayes 
estimator through a random effects formulation. From either perspective, the key idea is to 
reduce the influence of sampling variability by “borrowing strength” from other observations (as 
reflected in ?̂?). Since the shrinkage factor roughly equals the ratio of the sampling variance 𝜎𝑢2 to 
the overall variance of 𝑌𝑢—that is, 𝜏2 + 𝜎𝑢2— the shrinkage rule may be interpreted as “purging” 
sampling errors from the estimation of true parameters. This procedure can be highly effective 
when sampling uncertainty is substantial relative to the true variation among the parameters of 
interest. As illustrated by Efron and Morris (1975), given data from the first 45 bats of 18 major 
league baseball players in the 1970 season, the shrinkage approach performs much better than 
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the MLE in predicting their future batting averages. More recently, Savitz and Raudenbush 
(2009) showed that similar types of shrinkage estimators can improve the precision and 
predictive validity of ecometric measures in neighborhood studies. Considering that observed log 
odds ratios frequently suffer from large sampling errors, we expect that the shrinkage approach 
can significantly enhance the estimation precision of log odds ratios by pooling data from 
multiple mobility tables. 
Meanwhile, we notice from equation (7) that the degree of shrinkage is higher for 
observations with larger sampling variances. This relationship is intuitive because the need for 
“borrowing strength” should be stronger for relatively imprecise estimates. Differences in the 
degree of shrinkage, moreover, can alter the rank order of the estimates; that is, the shrinkage 
estimates may rank the population log odds ratios differently from the observed log odds ratios. 
Efron and Morris (1975) noted that the empirical Bayes method typically outperforms MLE in 
ordering the true values. Therefore, besides improving the estimation precision of individual log 
odds ratios, the shrinkage approach can also enhance the accuracy of cross-table comparisons. 
Estimation, Inference, and Implementation 
To empirically estimate 𝜇 and 𝜏2, a natural idea is to derive their MLE based on the joint 
marginal distribution 
𝑌𝑢 ∼
𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑝
𝑁(𝜇, 𝜏2 + 𝜎𝑢2�). 
Unfortunately, the likelihood equation in this case defies an analytical solution. I now describe 
an alternative approach proposed by Carter and Rolph (1974), one that is closely related to the 
procedures used in Fay and Herriot (1979), Morris (1983), and Sidik and Jonkman (2005). As 
mentioned above, when 𝜏2 is known, the minimum variance unbiased estimator of 𝜇 is given by 
the weighted average of the 𝑌𝑢’s 
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?̂?(𝜏2) = ∑ 𝑤𝑘�𝜏2�𝑌𝑘𝐾𝑘=1
∑ 𝑤𝑘(𝜏2)𝐾𝑘=1  , 
where the weights are 
𝑤𝑢(𝜏2) = 1𝜏2+𝜎𝑘2�  . 
Here 𝑤𝑢(𝜏2) and ?̂?(𝜏2) highlight their dependence on 𝜏2. Meanwhile, we observe that the 
weighted sum of squared deviations of the 𝑌𝑢’s follows a chi-square distribution with 𝐾 − 1 
degrees of freedom—that is, 
∑ 𝑤𝑢(𝜏2)�𝑌𝑢 − ?̂?(𝜏2)�2~𝜒𝐾−12𝐾𝑢=1 . 
Thus we have E �∑ 𝑤𝑢(𝜏2)�𝑌𝑢 − ?̂?(𝜏2)�2𝐾𝑢=1 � = 𝐾 − 1 . 
Carter and Rolph (1974) suggested that 𝜏2 be estimated as the unique positive solution that 
satisfies 
∑ 𝑤𝑢�𝜏2�� �𝑌𝑢 − ?̂?�𝜏2���
2
𝐾
𝑢=1 = 𝐾 − 1 . 
In the case where no positive solution exists, 𝜏2� is set to be zero. To solve the above equation, a 
simple Newton-Raphson procedure has been described in Fay and Herriot (1979:276), which 
typically converges in fewer than ten iterations. With the converged value of  𝜏2�, the prior mean 
𝜇 is estimated accordingly as ?̂?�𝜏2��. By plugging ?̂? and 𝜏2� into equation (7), we obtain the 
empirical Bayes estimates of the unknown 𝜃𝑢’s. 
To fully assess the uncertainty of the empirical Bayes estimator (7), we must take into 
account the estimation of 𝜇, 𝜏2, and 𝜎𝑢2’s. To avoid analytical challenges, I now consider a naive 
estimator of the standard error of 𝜃�𝑢𝐸𝐵 that treats the variance estimates 𝜏2� and 𝜎𝑢2�’s as the true 
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underlying parameters. Denoting by 𝐵𝑢 the shrinkage factor 
(𝐾−3)𝜎𝑘2�(𝐾−1)�𝜏2�+𝜎𝑘2�� in equation (7), the 
mean squared error between 𝜃�𝑢𝐸𝐵 and 𝜃𝑢 can be written as 
𝐸�𝜃�𝑢
𝐸𝐵 − 𝜃𝑢�
2 = 𝐸[(1 − 𝐵𝑢)𝑌𝑢 + 𝐵𝑢?̂? − 𝜃𝑢]2 = 𝐸[(1 − 𝐵𝑢)(𝑌𝑢 − 𝜃𝑢) + 𝐵𝑢(?̂? − 𝜃𝑢)]2  = (1 − 𝐵𝑢)𝜎𝑢2� + 2(1 −𝐵𝑢)𝐵𝑢 � 𝑤𝑘∑𝑤𝑘� 𝜎𝑢2� + 𝐵𝑢2(𝜏2� − 2𝑤𝑘𝜏2�∑𝑤𝑘 + 1∑𝑤𝑘) . 
Therefore, by taking the square root of the right-hand side, we obtain an estimator of the 
standard error of 𝜃�𝑢𝐸𝐵. Alternatively, we can fit random effects models using standard 
software for meta-analysis (such as the metafor package in R; see Viechtbauer 2010) and 
extract estimates of BLUPs and their standard errors, which should be very close to the 
empirical Bayes estimates. 
The standard error derived above tends to underestimate the uncertainty of 𝜃�𝑢𝐸𝐵’s 
because it ignores the estimation of 𝜏2 and 𝜎𝑢2’s. A fully Bayesian approach, as noted by 
Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), will take account of the estimation uncertainty of 𝜇, 𝜏2, and 
𝜃𝑢’s simultaneously. To build a full Bayes model, we may supply the hyperparameters 𝜇 
and 𝜏2 with noninformative priors (for example, by setting a normal prior with a variance of 106 for 𝜇 and a uniform prior from 0 to 104 for 𝜏2). Such a model can be easily 
implemented using standard MCMC software such as BUGS. Later I will illustrate both the 
empirical Bayes and the full Bayes methods using a set of 16 mobility tables. 
Usual Estimator Versus Shrinkage Estimator in Simulation 
We now turn our attention back to the setting of 𝐾 2 × 2 mobility tables, each representing a 
country. As noted earlier, the shrinkage factor is decided by the sampling variance of the 
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observed log odds ratio relative to the true variation in log odds ratio among the K countries. The 
influence of shrinkage, therefore, should be stronger when the true variation in mobility is 
relatively small compared with sampling errors. On the other hand, since sampling variance 
typically differs from country to country, the shrinkage estimates may exhibit a different rank 
order from that of the usual estimates. Clearly, the extent of this discrepancy should depend on 
the extent of variation in sample size among these countries. In this subsection, I use numerical 
simulation to examine how potential advantages of the shrinkage approach vary along these two 
dimensions. I compare the performance between the usual estimator (1) and the shrinkage 
estimator (7) in two aspects: (1) total squared error, and (2) correlation with the true log odds 
ratios. 
Let us consider 100 2×2 mobility tables depicting, say, intergenerational mobility 
between white-collar and blue-collar occupations in 100 countries.19 Following the convention in 
mobility table analysis, I represent father’s occupation in rows and son’s occupation in columns. 
In this simulation, I assume that these countries are at the same stage of industrial development 
such that 40% of the sample is from white-collar origin in all of the 100 mobility tables. In other 
words, the row marginal distribution is fixed to be (0.4, 0.6). Despite the homogeneous origin 
distribution, I allow these countries to vary in the extent of relative mobility as measured by the 
log odds ratio. In particular, I create three scenarios in which the true variation in log odds ratio 
among these countries is small, medium, and large. Suppose that a son’s occupation given a 
father’s occupation follows a binomial distribution, and use 𝑒1|1𝑢  and 𝑒1|2𝑢  to denote the 
probabilities of working in a white-collar occupation respectively for a person from white-collar 
origin and for a person from blue-collar origin in country k. I assume that 𝑒1|1𝑢  and 𝑒1|2𝑢  are 
                                                          
19 For convenience, the agricultural sector is omitted in this simulation study. 
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independently and uniformly distributed around 0.7 and 0.3, respectively, which means that the 
probability of being immobile (i.e., staying in the main diagonal of the table) is around 0.7 for 
both white-collar and blue-collar occupations. I then construct the three scenarios by letting the 
range of the two uniform distributions be 0.08, 0.16, and 0.24.20 In other words,  𝑒1|1𝑢  and 𝑒1|2𝑢   
are independently drawn from the following two distributions: 
𝑒1|1𝑢 ∼𝑟.𝑟.𝑒. Uniform(0.7 − 0.04 ∗ 𝛼, 0.7 + 0.04 ∗ 𝛼),   𝑘 = 1,2,⋯ 100, (9)  𝑒1|2𝑢 ∼𝑟.𝑟.𝑒. Uniform(0.3 − 0.04 ∗ 𝛼, 0.3 + 0.04 ∗ 𝛼),   𝑘 = 1,2,⋯ 100, (10) 
where the parameter 𝛼, which may take 1, 2, and 3, is used to generate settings in which the true 
variation in log odds ratio is small, medium, and large. 
 The three scenarios above differ in the true variation of log odds ratio and thus in the 
estimate of 𝜏2 in equation (7), which will affect the shrinkage factor uniformly for all countries. 
As mentioned earlier, the contrasts between the shrinkage estimator and the usual estimator may 
also depend on the amount of variation in sample size among the mobility tables, which shapes 
the variation among the 𝜎𝑢2�’s. Therefore, I also compare the performance between the two 
estimators as variation in sample size changes from very small to very large. Specifically, I 
assume that the sample size follows a log-uniform distribution as below: log𝑛++𝑢 ∼𝑟.𝑟.𝑒.  Uniform �log 800 ∗ 2𝛽 , log 1250 ∗ 2𝛽�,   𝑘 = 1,2,⋯100, (11) 
where 𝑛++𝑢 denotes the sample size for country 𝑘. I vary the parameter 𝛽 from 0 to 4 with a step 
size of 1, thereby generating five scenarios with a gradual change in the variation of sample size 
while fixing the median sample size among these countries to be around 1,000. For example, 
                                                          
20 The parameters for the row marginal distribution, the average transition probabilities, and the 
ranges of the transition probabilities, are all chosen based on the empirical mobility tables for 16 
countries collected by Hazelrigg and Garnier (1976). 
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sample size will range between 800 and 1,250 when 𝛽 takes 0 but range between 50 and 20,000 
when 𝛽 takes 4. 
In this simulation, I exhaust all possible combinations of 𝛼 and 𝛽, resulting in 3 × 5 =15 scenarios. For each of these scenarios, I generated the 100 mobility tables in the following 
steps: 
1. For each table k, generate the sample size using 𝑛++𝑢 =   ⌊exp(𝑀)⌉, where 𝑀 is a 
random draw from the uniform distribution (11), and  ⌊exp�𝑀�⌉ means taking the 
integer closest to exp(𝑀). 
2. Calculate the row marginals (𝑛1+𝑢, 𝑛2+𝑢) by assigning 40% of the sample size 𝑛++𝑢 
to the first category (i.e., white-collar). 
3. Generate the transition probabilities 𝑒1|1𝑢   and 𝑒1|2𝑢   using the uniform distributions (9) 
and (10). 
4. Create the mobility table (𝑛11𝑢,𝑛12𝑢, 𝑛21𝑢,𝑛22𝑢) using binomial draws for each 
row—that is,  binomial (𝑛1+𝑢,𝑒1|1𝑢 ) for the first row and binomial (𝑛2+𝑢,𝑒1|2𝑢 )  for 
the second row. 
Given the simulated tables, I applied both the usual estimator (1) and the empirical Bayes 
estimator (7) to estimate the log odds ratios. I then evaluated the performance of the two 
estimators using two criteria: (1) total squared error, i.e., ∑ �𝜃�𝑢 − 𝜃𝑢�
2100
𝑢=1 , and (2) Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient (among the 100 countries)—that is, Cor(𝜃�𝑢 ,𝜃𝑢). To smooth random 
fluctuations, I averaged these two measures over 500 iterations of the above procedures (data 
generation, estimation, and evaluation) for each of the 15 scenarios. 
Figure IV.1 presents the results, with panel (a) for total squared errors and panel (b) for 
the correlation coefficients. In both panels, I represent the usual estimator in squares and the 
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shrinkage estimator in triangles. The three scenarios in which the true variation in log odds ratio 
is small, medium, and large are represented respectively by solid, dashed, and dotted lines. First, 
we observe that in virtually all of the 15 scenarios, the shrinkage estimator exhibits lower total 
squared errors and higher correlations with the true values than does the usual estimator. This is 
consistent with theoretical results on joint estimation of normal means as discussed by Efron and 
Morris (1973; 1975). Second, as shown by both panels, the benefits of the shrinkage estimator 
are greater when the true variation in log odds ratio is smaller. This relationship is intuitive 
because the shrinkage approach is essentially pooling information across cases, which should be 
more effective when these cases are more similar to each other. We also note that for both 
estimators, the correlation with the true values increases as the true variation in log odds ratio 
increases. This is because when the true differences are larger, they are less likely to be 
confounded by sampling fluctuations and thus more likely to be detected from the data. Finally, 
reading along the X-axis, we find that the advantage of the shrinkage estimator becomes more 
pronounced as the variation in sample size increases. In fact, both estimators perform worse 
when there is greater variation in sample size. However, the shrinkage estimator is far more 
robust than the usual estimator in this aspect. For instance, in the case where the true variation in 
log odds ratio is small (solid lines), the correlation between the usual estimates and the true 
values declines from above 0.7 to below 0.5 as the variation in sample size changes from very 
small to very large, whereas the correlation between the shrinkage estimates and the true values 
stays roughly unchanged (around 0.71) regardless of the variation in sample size. 
To sum up, this simulation study suggests that the shrinkage estimator almost always 
outperforms the usual estimator in joint estimation of multiple log odds ratios, either in terms of 
total squared error or in terms of the correlation with the true values. Moreover, the advantage of 
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the shrinkage estimator is more pronounced when there is less variation in the true log odds ratio 
or more variation in sample size. In particular, the higher correlations with the true values 
exhibited by the shrinkage estimator reveal its great potential for enhancing the accuracy of 
cross-table comparisons. 
Shrinkage at Work: An Example  
I now apply the shrinkage method to the mobility data assembled by Hazelrigg and Garnier 
(1976), which provide 3 × 3 classifications of son’s occupation by father’s occupation for 16 
countries in the 1960s and 1970s (henceforth referred to as HG-16). The data are displayed in 
Table IV.1. In each of the 16 tables, occupation is categorized as white collar, blue collar, or 
farm. Let us consider two sets of log odds ratios that are of particular substantive interest: (1) the 
log odds ratio pertaining to the 2 × 2 subtable of white collar and blue collar workers, and (2) the 
log odds ratio pertaining to the 2 × 2 subtable of blue collar workers and farmers. We may 
perceive these two log odds ratios as measuring the strengths of class boundaries between white 
collar and blue collar and between blue collar and farm. For each measure, I contrast the 
observed log odds ratios with both the empirical Bayes estimates and the full Bayes estimates. 
To generate the full Bayes estimates, I ran five independent Markov chains, each containing 
4,000 iterations, and retained the last 2,000 vectors from each run. The point estimates and the 
standard errors of the log odds ratios were estimated respectively as the posterior means and the 
posterior standard deviations. 
The results are shown in Table IV.2. On the one hand, we observe that for countries with 
very large sample sizes, such as Spain, United States, and West Germany, both the point 
estimates and the standard errors are largely the same across different methods. Because within-
sample precision is sufficiently high for these countries, the shrinkage factors assigned to the 
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observed log odds ratios are almost zero. The shrinkage estimates, therefore, closely resemble 
the MLE in both location and precision. On the other hand, for relatively sparse tables, such as 
Finland, Norway, and Sweden, both the point estimates and the standard errors are markedly 
changed under the shrinkage methods. However, the empirical Bayes approach and the full 
Bayes approach yield essentially identical point estimates, although the latter gives slightly 
larger standard errors as it incorporates the uncertainty of the prior variance 𝜏2. Overall, 
shrinkage estimates based on either approach are more precise than the usual estimates. 
 To demonstrate the effects of shrinkage, I visualize the contrasts between the observed 
log odds ratios and the empirical Bayes estimates in Figure IV.2, where 9 of the 16 countries are 
marked for illustration: Belgium, France, Hungary, Italy, Spain, United States, West Malaysia, 
Norway, and Sweden. Panel (a) shows the log odds ratio between white collar and blue collar. 
First, we find that most of the cross-country differences are consistent between the two sets of 
estimates: For example, according to either estimator, Spain and West Malaysia are respectively 
the least mobile (i.e., with the highest log odds ratio) and the most mobile (i.e., with the lowest 
log odds ratio) among the nine countries. However, because the observed log odds ratios differ in 
sampling precision, the shrinkage estimator implies a slightly different rank order among these 
countries. In particular, Norway is more mobile than the United States according to the usual 
estimator (i.e., the observed odds ratio) but less mobile than the United States according to the 
shrinkage estimator. In other words, the empirical Bayes model suggests that the higher mobility 
of Norway exhibited by the raw data is simply due to its larger sampling variance, not because 
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the barrier between white collar and blue collar jobs is more permeable in Norway than in the 
United States.21 
Panel (b) demonstrates the effects of shrinkage for the log odds ratio between blue collar 
and farm. Overall, these estimates are much higher than the estimates in the left panel, indicating 
that the barrier between these two classes is much harder to cross than the barrier between white 
collar and blue collar jobs. Similar to the left panel, the rankings among the nine countries are 
not much altered under the shrinkage approach, except that Norway is again “shrunk toward the 
mean.” We also find that the influence of shrinkage is the most pronounced for Belgium, which 
is markedly less mobile than France according to the observed log odds ratio but closely 
resembles France in their shrinkage estimates. This is clearly related to the sparse cell of (blue 
collar, farm) in the Belgian table (see again Table IV.1). 
Adjusted Estimation of the Altham Index 
For mobility tables with more than two categories, we can use the shrinkage estimator (7) to 
calculate summary measures of association that are based on aggregations of log odds ratios. In 
this section, I construct an adjusted estimator of the Altham index, an aggregate measure of 
association that has been recently employed for studying intergenerational occupational mobility 
(Ferrie 2005; Long and Ferrie 2007, 2013). Results from a set of calibrated simulations suggest 
that using shrinkage estimates of log odds ratios can substantially improve the estimation 
precision of the Altham index. 
                                                          
21 If we calculate the z-score for the difference in observed log odds ratio between Norway and 
the U.S., we will find that it is not statistically significant. 
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An Adjusted Estimator of the Altham Index 
To assess the total amount of association embodied in a two-way contingency table, Altham 
(1970) proposed a number of measures that are based on aggregations of log odds ratios. One 
such measure is identical to the Euclidean distance between the full sets of log odds ratios in two 
𝐼 × 𝐽 tables 𝑃 and 𝑄—that is, 
𝑑(𝑃,𝑄) = �∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ �log 𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑙𝑖
− log 𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑙𝑙
𝑞𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑙𝑖
�
2
𝐽
𝑚=1
𝐼
𝑙=1
𝐽
𝑖=1
𝐼
𝑟=1 �
1/2
, 
where 𝑒𝑟𝑖 and 𝑞𝑟𝑖 denote the probabilities associated with the cell (𝑖, 𝑗) in table 𝑃 and table 𝑄. 
While the metric 𝑑(𝑃,𝑄) gauges the distance between the row-column associations in tables 𝑃 
and 𝑄, it does not tell us in which table the rows and the columns are more closely associated. To 
answer this question, we can compare 𝑑(𝑃, 𝐽) with 𝑑(𝑄, 𝐽), where 𝐽 denotes a contingency table 
in which the rows and columns are completely independent. Since all of the log odds ratios are 
zero in an independent table, we have 
𝑑(𝑃, 𝐽) = �∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ �log 𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑙𝑖
�
2
𝐽
𝑚=1
𝐼
𝑙=1
𝐽
𝑖=1
𝐼
𝑟=1 �
1/2
.  (12) 
We can see that 𝑑(𝑃, 𝐽) is the square root of the sum of all squared log odds ratios in table 𝑃. A 
larger value of 𝑑(𝑃, 𝐽) indicates a stronger association between the rows and columns. Hence, 
when 𝑃 is a mobility table, a larger 𝑑(𝑃, 𝐽) corresponds to a more rigid class regime. Although 
this approach to comparing mobility tables is lesser-known than log-linear models in 
comparative stratification research, it has been recently employed by economic historians to 
study long-term trends in occupational mobility in Great Britain and the United States (Ferrie 
2005; Long and Ferrie 2007, 2013). From here on, I use “the Altham index” to mean 𝑑(𝑃, 𝐽) for 
a contingency table 𝑃. 
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 Now suppose we have a set of 𝐼 × 𝐼 mobility tables 𝑀1,𝑀2,⋯𝑀𝑢 for 𝐾 countries. For 
each country 𝑘, we can directly calculate the Altham index by substituting the observed log odds 
ratios: 
?̂?Direct(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) = �∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ �log 𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑘𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑘�2𝐽𝑚=1𝐼𝑙=1𝐽𝑖=1𝐼𝑟=1 �1/2 ,   𝑘 = 1,2,⋯𝐾,  (13) 
where 𝑛𝑟𝑖𝑢 denotes the observed frequency associated with the cell (𝑖, 𝑗) in table 𝑘.22 On the 
other hand, we can use the shrinkage estimator of the log odds ratio for each row-column 
combination (𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑙,𝑚), yielding an adjusted estimator of the Altham index: 
?̂?Adjusted(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) = �∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ �𝜃�(𝑟,𝑖,𝑙,𝑚),𝑢𝐸𝐵 �2𝐽𝑚=1𝐼𝑙=1𝐽𝑖=1𝐼𝑟=1 �1/2 ,   𝑘 = 1,2,⋯𝐾,  (14)  
where 𝜃�(𝑟,𝑖,𝑙,𝑚),𝑢𝐸𝐵  denotes the shrinkage estimator (7) of the log odds ratio log 𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑙𝑖 in table 𝑘.  
Since the Altham index is not a linear function of the log odds ratios, the adjusted estimator (14) 
cannot be expressed as a weighted average between the direct estimator (13) and a common 
mean as in equation (7). However, as we will see, the key effect of this adjustment is also 
“pulling” the direct estimates toward the middle, the extent of which depends on sample sizes of 
the corresponding tables. 
Direct Estimator Versus Adjusted Estimator in Simulation 
Below, I use numerical simulation to evaluate the performance of the direct estimator (13) and 
the adjusted estimator (14) for the Altham index. As in the case of the log odds ratio, I compare 
them in two aspects: (1) total squared error, and (2) correlation with the true values. To mimic 
mobility regimes in the real world, I use HG-16 to motivate my simulation setup. First, I fitted 
                                                          
22 As before, when any of the four cells is zero, one half is added to all of the four cells before 
calculation. 
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the 16 3 × 3 mobility tables using four log-linear (or log-multiplicative) models: (1) quasi-
perfect mobility, (2) uniform inheritance, (3) perfect blue-collar mobility, and (4) the Unidiff 
model with full row-column interaction. These models have been proposed by Grusky and 
Hauser (1984) (a,b,c) and Xie (1992) (d) to compare mobility regimes of the 16 countries.23 I 
then treated the estimated parameters as the true parameters, yielding four data-generating 
models—that is, four simulation setups. For each of the four setups, I generated 1,000 
independent samples of the 16 tables, and, for each sample, obtained the direct and the adjusted 
estimates of the Altham index. With the “true” Altham indices readily available from the model 
parameters, I evaluated the two estimators using three criteria: (1) total squared error, (2) 
Pearson’s correlation with the true values, and (3) Spearman’s rank correlation with the true 
values. To smooth random fluctuations, each of the three measures was averaged over the 1,000 
samples, thus producing the total mean squared error (total MSE) and the average correlation 
coefficients. The results are summarized in Table IV.3. 
We first observe in this table that the adjusted estimator leads to a substantial reduction in 
total MSE in all of the four scenarios. For example, when data are generated from the Unidiff 
model, total MSE for the adjusted estimator is only about half of that for the direct estimator 
(38.8/77.0=50.4%). Moreover, the adjusted estimates compete well with the direct estimates in 
correlating with the true Altham indices. Specifically, the adjusted estimator (on average) brings 
an increase in Pearson’s correlation in all of the four scenarios and an increase in Spearman’s 
rank correlation in two of the four scenarios. Therefore, the shrinkage-based method for 
                                                          
23 Models (a), (b), (c) correspond respectively to models A2, A3, A4 in Grusky and Hauser (1984, 
p.389); model (d) corresponds to model FIx in Xie (1992, p.390). 
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calculating the Altham index not only yields more precise individual estimates, but may also 
enhance the accuracy of cross-table comparisons in the overall degree of association. 
An Illustration Using HG-16 
I now apply both estimators of the Altham index to the real data in HG-16. The results are shown  
in Figure IV.3(a), where the same nine countries as in the previous section are highlighted for 
illustration. Clearly, with the shrinkage estimates of log odds ratios, the Altham index tends to be 
shrunk toward the middle, yet the degree of shrinkage varies considerably from country to 
country. For example, the adjusted estimate is very similar to the direct estimate for France, but 
the estimate for Sweden is heavily altered by the adjustment. According to the direct estimates, 
Sweden ranks as the least mobile (i.e., with the highest Altham index) among the 16 countries; 
but by the adjusted estimates, Sweden stands right in the middle, more mobile than Hungary, 
France, Belgium, Italy, and Spain. Such a sharp contrast suggests that the high (direct) estimate 
of the Altham index for Sweden is primarily a result of large sampling errors for some of the log 
odds ratios in the Swedish data. As was shown in Table IV.1, the cell (white collar, farm) of the 
Swedish table contains no observation, which may have led to an incredibly high estimate of the 
Altham index. 
We can also evaluate the Altham index for a subset of the mobility table. Figure IV.3(b)  
presents the results for the same set of tables with the farm-farm cells excluded. The uniqueness 
of the farm-farm cell has been emphasized by Xie and Killewald (2013), who argued that the 
extremely persistent degree of inheritance from farming among farmers (regardless of historical 
contexts) challenges the utility of odds-ratio-based measures for comparing mobility regimes 
with very different levels of industrialization. Hence, calculating the Altham index without the 
farm-farm cell serves as a sensitivity check on the results in panel 3(a). Two findings emerge 
 115 
 
from this analysis. First, compared with panel (a), we find that the exclusion of the farm-farm 
cell leads to significant changes in the positions of these countries along the mobility spectrum. 
For instance, when the full tables are analyzed, France and Hungary are fairly close to each other, 
both ranking among the least mobile regimes; when the farm-farm cells are excluded, France 
appears to be one of the most mobile countries, whereas Hungary stands out as the single most 
immobile regime, with an Altham index far higher than those of the others. Second, although the 
adjusted estimates have the same rank order as the direct estimates for the nine countries marked 
here, they differ substantially in relative positions. For example, according to the direct estimates 
(without the farm-farm cell), Norway and Sweden are far apart, one very close to West Malaysia 
and the other only slightly lower than Spain; however, with the shrinkage-based adjustment, 
these two Nordic countries are much more similar, with their Altham indices closer to France 
and the United States than to West Malaysia and Spain. 
Shrinking Toward Convergence: Comparing the Altham Index with the Unidiff Model 
Although the Altham index provides a simple summary measure of the row-column association 
for a mobility table, log-linear modeling has been far more popular among sociological studies 
on intergenerational class mobility, in part due to its flexibility for accommodating fine-grained 
theoretical hypotheses (e.g., Erikson and Goldthorpe 1987; Hout 1984, 1988; Yamaguchi 1987). 
Among a plethora of log-linear and log-multiplicative models that have been proposed for 
studying mobility tables, the Unidiff model (also known as the log-multiplicative layer effect 
model) is particularly recognized for its ability to provide a single parameter that captures cross-
table differences in social fluidity (Xie 1992; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). Hence, the Altham 
index and the Unidiff model constitute two different approaches to making overall comparisons 
between mobility tables. In this section, I first establish a theoretical equivalence between these 
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two approaches in the ideal case where the Unidiff model is the true data-generating model. Then, 
using two real data sets, I show that the adjusted estimates of the Altham index agree more 
closely with the layer effects estimated under the Unidiff model than do direct estimates of the 
Altham index. 
The Unidiff Model, the Layer Effect, and the Altham Index 
As in the preceding section, let us consider a set of 𝐼 × 𝐼 mobility tables 𝑀1,𝑀2,⋯𝑀𝑢 for 𝐾 
countries. In a log-linear analysis, these tables are typically treated as a three-way table with 𝐼 
rows, 𝐼 columns, and 𝐾 layers. Denoting by 𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑢 the expected frequency in the 𝑖th row, the 𝑗th 
column, and the 𝑘th layer (i.e., the 𝑘th country), the saturated log-linear model can be written as log𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑢 = 𝜇 + 𝜇𝑟𝑅 + 𝜇𝑖𝐶 + 𝜇𝑢𝐿 + 𝜇𝑟𝑢𝑅𝐿 + 𝜇𝑖𝑢𝐶𝐿 + 𝜇𝑟𝑖𝑅𝐶 + 𝜇𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑅𝐶𝐿. 
In this equation, the first six terms are used to saturate the marginal distributions of both the 
origin and the destination in each country, while the last two terms, 𝜇𝑟𝑖𝑅𝐶 and 𝜇𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑅𝐶𝐿 , capture 
variations in the origin-destination association across countries. However, since the saturated 
model exhausts all degrees of freedom, it would severely overfit the data. In practice, the 
researcher often wants to specify 𝜇𝑟𝑖𝑅𝐶 and 𝜇𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑅𝐶𝐿 in a parsimonious fashion. The Unidiff model, in 
particular, assumes that these countries share a common pattern of association between origin 
and destination while allowing the strength of association to vary across countries. As a result, 
the model can be written as log𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑢 = 𝜇 + 𝜇𝑟𝑅 + 𝜇𝑖𝐶 + 𝜇𝑢𝐿 + 𝜇𝑟𝑢𝑅𝐿 + 𝜇𝑖𝑢𝐶𝐿 + 𝜓𝑟𝑖𝜙𝑢. (15) 
Here, the parameter 𝜓𝑟𝑖 characterizes the common pattern of association, and the parameter 𝜙𝑢, 
which is called the “layer effect,” identifies the relative position of country 𝑘 along the mobility 
spectrum. 
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According to equation (15), the expected log odds ratio associated with the row-column 
combination (𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑙,𝑚) in table 𝑘 can be calculated as 
𝜃(𝑟,𝑖,𝑙,𝑚),𝑢 = log𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑢 − log𝐹𝑟𝑚𝑢 − log𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑢 + log𝐹𝑙𝑚𝑢 = 𝜃𝑟,𝑖,𝑙,𝑚∗ 𝜙𝑢,  (16) 
where 𝜃𝑟,𝑖,𝑙,𝑚∗ = 𝜓𝑟𝑖 − 𝜓𝑟𝑚 − 𝜓𝑙𝑖 + 𝜓𝑙𝑚. Therefore, under the Unidiff model, any log odds ratio 
in a given table is the product of a common log odds ratio 𝜃𝑟,𝑖,𝑙,𝑚∗  and the layer effect 𝜙𝑢. Clearly, 
a greater value of 𝜙𝑢 implies a lower degree of social fluidity. Substituting the above expression 
into equation (12), the Altham index becomes 
𝑑(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) = �∑ �𝜃(𝑟,𝑖,𝑙,𝑚),𝑢�𝑟,𝑖,𝑙,𝑚 2�1/2 = �∑ �𝜃𝑟,𝑖,𝑙,𝑚∗ �𝑟,𝑖,𝑙,𝑚 2�1/2 𝜙𝑢.  (17) 
Since the term �∑ �𝜃𝑟,𝑖,𝑙,𝑚∗ �𝑟,𝑖,𝑙,𝑚 2�1/2 does not depend on 𝑘, the Altham index 𝑑(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) is directly 
proportional to the layer effect 𝜙𝑢. In other words, these two measures of association are 
equivalent under the Unidiff model. 
Real mobility data, however, may fail to support the assumptions of the Unidiff model. 
For example, according to the likelihood ratio test, the Unidiff model fits poorly for HG-16 (Xie 
1992:390). In such cases, we may conclude that different mobility regimes exhibit different 
patterns of relative mobility, and proceed to develop more flexible models, such as the 
regression-type models proposed by Goodman and Hout (1998), to capture the nuances of cross-
table differences. Nonetheless, tempted by such questions as “Overall, is country A more mobile 
than country B?” the researcher may still be interested in reducing subtle, multidimensional 
differences to simple, one-dimensional contrasts. In this regard, the Unidiff model and the 
Altham index constitute two reasonable yet distinct approaches. A natural question, then, is 
whether these two approaches would yield concordant results. Since the layer effect and the 
Altham index are equivalent when the Unidiff model is true, we would expect that they produce 
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more similar results when data are more congruent with the Unidiff model. On the other hand, 
given the advantages of the adjusted estimator over the direct estimator for the Altham index, it 
is reasonable to conjecture that the adjusted estimator agrees more closely than the direct 
estimator with results from the Unidiff model. Below, I use two sets of real mobility tables to test 
these two hypotheses. 
Shrinking Toward Convergence: Evidence from Two Data Sets 
I apply both estimators of the Altham index, along with the Unidiff model, to two data sets: (1) 
HG-16—that is, the 16 3 × 3 mobility tables assembled by Hazelrigg and Garnier (1976), and (2) 
a collection of 149 6 × 6 mobility tables from 35 countries assembled by Ganzeboom, Luijkx, 
and Treiman (1989), henceforth GLT-149. While occupation in HG-16 is crudely classified as 
white collar, blue collar, and farm, GLT-149 adopts the six-category version of the EGP class 
scheme: the service class (I+II), routine nonmanual workers (III), petty bourgeoisie (IVa+b), 
farmers and agricultural laborers (IVc+VIIb), skilled manual workers (V+VI), and unskilled 
manual workers (VIIa). 
 To assess the extent to which different estimators of the Altham index accord with the 
layer effects estimated under the Unidiff model, I use Spearman’s rank correlation as well as the 
Pearson correlation. Previous researchers analyzing HG-16 have pointed out that Hungary 
significantly deviates from the other 15 countries in patterns of interclass mobility (Grusky and 
Hauser 1984; Xie 1992). For this reason, I analyzed both the full set of HG-16 and the 15 tables 
excluding the Hungarian case (henceforth referred to as HG-15). The results are shown in Table 
IV.4. We can see that for all three data sets, the fitted layer effects 𝜙�𝑢Unidiff tend to correlate more 
strongly with the adjusted estimates of the Altham index than with the direct estimates, 
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especially by Spearman’s rank correlation. For example, the rank correlation for GLT-149 is 
0.839 between ?̂?Direct(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) and 𝜙�𝑢Unidiff but 0.899 between ?̂?Adjusted(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) and 𝜙�𝑢Unidiff.  
On the other hand, we notice that when Hungary is excluded from HG-16, both estimates 
of the Altham index become more aligned with the fitted layer effects. The Pearson correlation, 
for example, increases from 0.858 to 0.917 between ?̂?Direct(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) and 𝜙�𝑢Unidiff and from 0.852 
to 0.939 between ?̂?Adjusted(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) and 𝜙�𝑢Unidiff. These results accord well with our first 
hypothesis: Because Hungary contributes the lion’s share to the model deviance (i.e., 𝐺2), its 
exclusion considerably improves the fit between the data and the Unidiff model, thereby 
producing greater consistency between model-free (i.e., the Altham index) and model-based (i.e., 
the Unidiff model) inferences. To explore this relationship further, I examine how the above 
correlations change as the most poorly fitted cases are progressively excluded from the data sets. 
Specifically, for HG-16, I performed a stepwise elimination of Hungary, France, West Germany, 
the United States, and Spain——in order of decreasing 𝐺2 under the Unidiff model——and 
recalculated the correlations for each subset of the 16 tables. For GLT-149, the same procedures 
were followed except that five tables, rather than one table, were removed at a time and the 
correlation coefficients were recalculated until 40 tables were deleted. 
Figure IV.4 shows the results, with panel (a) for HG-16 and panel (b) for GLT-149. In 
both panels, I represent Pearson’s correlation in solid lines and Spearman’s rank correlation in 
dashed lines. Meanwhile, squares and triangles denote direct and adjusted estimates of the 
Altham index, respectively. From the four contrasts between squares and triangles, we notice that 
the adjusted estimates of the Altham index almost always correlate more strongly with the fitted 
layer effects than do the direct estimates. On the other hand, reading along the X-axis, we find 
that the correlation coefficients generally increase as the most poorly fitted cases are excluded 
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from the data sets. The upward drift, however, is more noticeable for the adjusted estimator than 
for the direct estimator. As a result, the gap between ?̂?Direct(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) and ?̂?Adjusted(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) in their 
correlations with 𝜙�𝑢Unidiff grows larger as data align more closely with the Unidiff model. For 
example, when the full set of GLT-149 is analyzed, the Pearson correlation between 
?̂?Adjusted(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) and 𝜙�𝑢Unidiff is 0.803, slightly lower than that between ?̂?Direct(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) and 
𝜙�𝑢
Unidiff (0.817, see again Table IV.4); but when the 40 tables with the largest deviances are 
excluded, the adjusted estimates of Altham indices correlate much more strongly with the fitted 
layer effects than do the direct estimates. 
In short, the above results suggest that in assessing the overall degree of social fluidity, 
the adjusted estimator of the Altham index accords more closely with the Unidiff model than 
does the direct estimator. Moreover, the contrast becomes more pronounced when data are more 
congruent with the Unidiff model. How do we understand these findings? First, we note that the 
adjusted estimator of the Altham index differs from the direct estimator only in its reliance on 
shrinkage estimates of the log odds ratios. As mentioned earlier, the underlying principle of the 
shrinkage method is to borrow information from other cases, particularly through an empirical 
Bayes model with a normal prior. The adjusted estimator of the Altham index, therefore, may be 
considered as a semiparametric method because it employs a normal Bayes model to smooth data 
across multiple tables but imposes no parametric constraints on the pattern of association within 
tables. In contrast, the direct estimator of the Altham index is fully nonparametric, involving no 
data smoothing either across or within tables. On the other hand, the Unidiff model stipulates 
that all log odds ratios are determined as a product of a common pattern of association and table-
specific effects. This multiplicative specification requires the Unidiff model to pool data both 
across tables (for estimating 𝜓𝑟𝑖) and across cells within tables (for estimating 𝜙𝑢). Hence, in the 
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way that data are pooled to draw inferences, the adjusted estimator of the Altham index stands 
closer than the direct estimator to the Unidiff model , which probably explains why the shrinkage 
approach boosts convergence between a descriptive index and a parametric model in gauging 
social fluidity. 
Summary and Discussion 
Building on an empirical Bayes framework, I have proposed a shrinkage estimator of the log 
odds ratio for comparing mobility tables. This estimator enhances estimation precision by 
borrowing information across multiple tables while placing no restrictions on the pattern of 
association within tables. This approach stands in stark contrast to the usual MLE of the log odds 
ratio, which involves no data pooling either across or within tables. Numerical simulation 
suggests that the shrinkage estimator outperforms the usual MLE in both the total squared error 
and the correlation with the true values. Moreover, the benefits of the shrinkage method are 
greater when there is less variation among the true log odds ratios or more variation in sampling 
precision. 
Furthermore, the shrinkage estimator of the log odds ratio can be employed to calculate 
the Altham index, an aggregate measure of association that has been recently adopted in 
comparative mobility research. Results from a set of calibrated simulations suggest that the 
adjusted estimator can substantially improve estimation precision while maintaining high 
correlations with the true values. Finally, using two real data sets, we find that the adjusted 
estimator of the Altham index accords more closely with the Unidiff model than does the direct 
estimator of the Altham index. This finding, as I have discussed, stems from the fact that both the 
Unidiff model and the shrinkage approach enforce information sharing across tables, albeit via 
apparently different mechanisms. 
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The shrinkage estimator (7) derives from a Bayes model where a common prior—that is, 
equation (4)— is assumed for all cases. This assumption can easily be relaxed to incorporate our 
prior knowledge about the similarities and differences between mobility regimes. In particular, 
we can extend the prior distribution (4) to 
𝜃𝑢 ∼
𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑝
𝑁(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝑋𝑢, 𝜏2), 
where 𝑋𝑢 denotes a group of exogenous variables posited to affect the true log odds ratio. The 
empirical Bayes estimator (7) then becomes 
𝜃�𝑢
𝐸𝐵 = 𝛼� + ?̂?𝑇𝑋𝑢 + [1 − (𝐾−𝑅−3)𝜎𝑘2�(𝐾−𝑅−1)�𝜏2�+𝜎𝑘2��](𝑌𝑢 − 𝛼� − ?̂?𝑇𝑋𝑢), 
where 𝛼� and ?̂? denote estimates of 𝛼 and 𝛽, and 𝑅 represents the dimension of 𝑋𝑢.24 In this 
formulation, the usual estimate 𝑌𝑢 is shrunk not toward a common mean but toward the 
conditional mean 𝛼� + ?̂?𝑇𝑋𝑢. For example, if we assume that economic development promotes 
social mobility, as the “thesis of industrialism” suggests (Treiman 1970), 𝑋𝑢 could be a measure 
of the level of industrialization in country 𝑘. In this case, the shrinkage estimator borrows 
information not uniformly from all countries but mainly from countries at similar levels of 
industrialization. Note that if the number of tables 𝐾 far exceeds the number of predictors 𝑅, the 
adjustment factor 𝐾−𝑅−3
𝐾−𝑅−1
 will be close to one and the empirical Bayes estimates can be 
approximated by EBLUPs from mixed-effects meta-analysis of log odds ratios (see Viechtbauer 
[2010] for a guide to implementation). 
For evaluating the overall degree of social fluidity, the Unidiff model and the Altham 
index constitute two valid yet distinctive approaches. The Unidiff model stipulates that all log 
                                                          
24 The adjustment factor changes from 𝐾−3
𝐾−1
 to 𝐾−𝑅−3
𝐾−𝑅−1
 because R additional degrees of freedom are 
used to estimate the hyper-parameters. See Morris (1983) for a more technical discussion. 
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odds ratios are determined multiplicatively by a common pattern of association and layer-
specific effects. This is a flexible but nontrivial assumption. Not only does it require that 
different log odds ratios within a table are of the same relative magnitudes in all mobility 
regimes, but it also means that the rank order among mobility regimes does not depend on which 
log odds ratio is being examined. For example, a Unidiff model for GH-16 would imply that the 
two sets of log odds ratios in Figure IV.2 exhibit the same relative positions in the two panels, 
which is obviously at odds with the data. The Unidiff model, therefore, may incur a model 
specification bias if the true mobility regimes being compared do not comport with the 
“common-pattern” assumption. In contrast, the Altham index is fully nonparametric, thus being 
exempt from any type of model specification bias. For the same reason, however, direct 
calculation of the Altham index is susceptible to large sampling errors, especially for sparse 
tables. The shrinkage approach presented in this paper—which exploits a parametric Bayes 
model to “borrow strength” across tables but remains model-free within tables—serves as an 
eclectic formula for comparing mobility regimes, striking a balance between sampling variance 
and model specification bias. Clearly, this approach is applicable not only to comparative 
mobility analysis but to any area of research that calls for comparisons of multiple two-way 
contingency tables. 
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Figure IV.1 Usual estimator versus empirical Bayes estimator of the log odds ratio in total squared error 
(a) and Pearson’s correlation with the true values (b) under different scenarios. 
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Figure IV.2 Usual estimates and shrinkage estimates for two sets of log odds ratios in HG-16. 
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Figure IV.3 Direct estimates and adjusted estimates of the Altham index for HG-16 (a) and HG-16 
without farm-farm cells (b). 
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Figure IV.4 Direct estimates versus adjusted estimates of the Altham index in their correlations with 
ϕ ̂_k^Unidiff for varying subsets of HG-16 and GLT-149. 
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Table IV.1 Mobility Tables for 16 Countries, Father’s Occupation by Son’s Occupation 
Australia Belgium France Hungary 
292 170 29 497 100 12 2085 1047 74 479 190 14 
290 608 37 300 434 7 936 2367 57 1029 2615 347 
81 171 175 102 101 129 592 1255 1587 516 3110 3751 
Italy Japan Philippines Spain 
233 75 10 465 122 21 239 110 76 7622 2124 379 
104 291 23 159 258 20 91 292 111 3495 9072 597 
71 212 320 285 307 333 317 527 3098 4597 8173 14833 
United States West Germany West Malaysia Yugoslavia 
1650 641 34 3634 850 270 406 235 144 61 24 7 
1618 2692 70 1021 1694 306 176 369 183 37 92 13 
694 1648 644 1068 1310 1927 315 578 2311 77 148 223 
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
79 34 2 39 29 2 90 29 5 89 30 0 
55 119 8 24 115 10 72 89 11 81 142 3 
25 48 84 40 66 79 41 47 47 27 48 29 
Source:  Grusky and Hauser (1983:56); see also Raftery (1995:115). 
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Table IV.2 Point Estimates and Estimated Standard Errors for Two Sets of Log Odds Ratios in HG-16 
Under Different Estimation Methods 
 LOR b/w White Collar and Blue Collar LOR b/w Blue Collar and Farm 
 Observed Empirical Bayes 
Full 
Bayes Observed 
Empirical 
Bayes 
Full 
Bayes 
Australia 1.28 (0.12) 
1.35 
(0.11) 
1.35 
(0.12) 
2.82 
(0.20) 
2.82 
(0.19) 
2.82 
(0.19) 
Belgium 1.97 (0.13) 
1.93 
(0.12) 
1.94 
(0.13) 
4.37 
(0.40) 
3.95 
(0.34) 
3.98 
(0.37) 
France 1.62 (0.05) 
1.62 
(0.05) 
1.62 
(0.05) 
3.96 
(0.14) 
3.91 
(0.14) 
3.90 
(0.14) 
Hungary 1.86 (0.09) 
1.85 
(0.09) 
1.85 
(0.09) 
2.21 
(0.06) 
2.21 
(0.06) 
2.21 
(0.06) 
Italy 2.16 (0.18) 
2.05 
(0.15) 
2.05 
(0.16) 
2.95 
(0.23) 
2.93 
(0.22) 
2.95 
(0.22) 
Japan 1.82 (0.14) 
1.81 
(0.13) 
1.81 
(0.13) 
2.64 
(0.25) 
2.66 
(0.23) 
2.66 
(0.23) 
Philippines 1.94 (0.17) 
1.89 
(0.14) 
1.90 
(0.15) 
2.74 
(0.12) 
2.74 
(0.12) 
2.74 
(0.12) 
Spain 2.23 (0.03) 
2.23 
(0.03) 
2.23 
(0.03) 
3.32 
(0.04) 
3.31 
(0.04) 
3.31 
(0.04) 
United States 1.45 (0.06) 
1.47 
(0.06) 
1.46 
(0.06) 
2.71 
(0.13) 
2.71 
(0.13) 
2.71 
(0.13) 
West Germany 1.96 (0.05) 
1.95 
(0.05) 
1.95 
(0.05) 
2.10 
(0.07) 
2.11 
(0.07) 
2.11 
(0.07) 
West Malaysia 1.29 (0.12) 
1.36 
(0.11) 
1.35 
(0.12) 
2.09 
(0.10) 
2.10 
(0.10) 
2.10 
(0.10) 
Yugoslavia 1.84 (0.31) 
1.80 
(0.21) 
1.80 
(0.23) 
2.37 
(0.31) 
2.45 
(0.28) 
2.43 
(0.30) 
Denmark 1.61 (0.26) 
1.67 
(0.19) 
1.67 
(0.21) 
3.26 
(0.41) 
3.14 
(0.34) 
3.13 
(0.37) 
Finland 1.86 (0.33) 
1.80 
(0.21) 
1.81 
(0.23) 
2.62 
(0.37) 
2.67 
(0.32) 
2.67 
(0.31) 
Norway 1.34 (0.27) 
1.52 
(0.19) 
1.52 
(0.22) 
2.09 
(0.38) 
2.27 
(0.33) 
2.26 
(0.33) 
Sweden 1.65 (0.25) 
1.69 
(0.19) 
1.69 
(0.19) 
3.35 
(0.63) 
3.11 
(0.45) 
3.09 
(0.49) 
Note:  Numbers in parentheses are estimated standard errors. 
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Table IV.3 Direct Estimator Versus Adjusted Estimator of the Altham Index in Simulation 
Data Generating Model Estimator Total MSE 
Average Correlation with 𝑑(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) 
Pearson Spearman's Rank 
Quasi-perfect mobility 
 
?̂?Direct(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) 91.9 0.916 0.894 
?̂?Adjusted(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) 73.5 0.919 0.886 
Uniform inheritance 
 
?̂?Direct(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) 39.6 0.904 0.886 
?̂?Adjusted(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) 22.3 0.940 0.918 
Perfect blue-collar mobility 
 
?̂?Direct(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) 107.5 0.894 0.885 
?̂?Adjusted(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) 74.0 0.904 0.873 
Unidiff (full interaction) 
?̂?Direct(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) 77.0 0.867 0.855 
?̂?Adjusted(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) 38.8 0.906 0.882 
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Table IV.4 Correlations of Direct and Adjusted Estimates of the Altham Index with ϕ ̂_k^Unidiff. 
Data Set Estimator Pearson's Correlation 
Spearman's Rank 
Correlation 
HG-16 
 
?̂?Direct(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) 0.858 0.832 
?̂?Adjusted(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) 0.852 0.876 
HG-15 (w/o Hungary) 
 
?̂?Direct(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) 0.917 0.846 
?̂?Adjusted(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) 0.939 0.893 
GLT-149 
?̂?Direct(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) 0.817 0.839 
?̂?Adjusted(𝑀𝑢, 𝐽) 0.803 0.899 
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